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1. Introduction 
A failing state? 
The Republic of Yemen is a state in conflict. Recently the violence in the Saada 
province grew up to air bombings after five rounds of conflict (BBC 2009a; 
International Crisis Group 2009b). The conflict itself is about power and the principal 
direction in that Yemen is developing. While the central government speaks of a 
process of unification and central rule, the provinces and tribes argue that there is 
lack of local autonomy (Phillips 2008:77). The Salih government does not reach 
every part of the country as tribes or armed groups control several regions. 
The Failed States Index states that Yemen is a state in danger to become a failed 
state (Foreign Policy 2009b1); can it be categorised as a failing state? This would 
mean that the state has no authority in its territory, the living conditions become 
severe and obstacles for development would be overwhelming. Yemen is a Least 
Developed Country, ranging near the end of the Human Development Index (HDI-
rang 140, UNDP 2009b; UNDP 2009a:123). The Republic of Yemen is regarded as a 
refuge for terrorists by some researchers due to its instability (Foreign Policy 2009a; 
Carapcio 2007:153). The instability can, following failed states scholars, spread over 
to the region and have influence on the international stability (Rotberg 2002:127; 
Thürer 2008:42f.). The Republic of Yemen is actually at a crossroad. State officials 
discuss and fear the possibility of a failed state (International Crisis Group 2009:28). 
It becomes more important to face the challenging situation not only for the people in 
Yemen, but also for the global security situation2. Yemen is of strategic importance 
on the Gate of Lament, where one of the world’s most important shipping lanes is 
passing by (Phillips 2008:39). On the other side of the Gulf of Aden exists already a 
failed state, Somalia, which recently became popular as origin for pirates that operate 
before the coast of Yemen (ill.1).Therefore, stability in Yemen is crucial for the 
international system and for trade.  
 
Autocracy and Democracy in Yemen 
Yemen is autocratically ruled like nearly all countries in the Middle East, but is also 
characterised as “partly free” (Ill.23). Yemen already faced some democratisation, 
                                                 
1
 The Failed State Index was introduced by the Carnegie Endowment for international Peace – a think 
thank - and is a universal approach. 
2
 For the relevance of terrorism and sovereignty for the global security situation: Jackson/Sørensen 
2007:7 a. 250. 
3
 “Freedom House is an independent watchdog organisation that supports the expansion of freedom 
around the world” mostly financed by the U.S. government (Freedom House 2009). 
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with particularly free elections in 1993, the emergence of several parties after 
unification and a vital civil society (Carapico 2007; Schwedler 2006:60). Researchers 
assign, that Yemen had a “promising and remarkable democratisation process” 
(International Crisis Group 2009b:2).  
 
Democratisation as promotion of democracy is not only a national phenomenon, but 
is also influenced by the international environment. Democratisation is the 
transformation of an authoritarian system into a democratic regime, gives rights to 
the people, enforces participation and representation, and enlarges accountability. 
Yemen already faced democratic development without Western involvement. 
Nevertheless, democracy in Yemen became weaker after the civil war (Day 
2006:131) and was influenced by internal crisis and ongoing war (ill. 3). Are there 
chances for a renewed democratisation process in Yemen? The prospects for this 
are, facing the current difficulties within the country, unfortunately bleak.  
 
Democracy is not a clearly defined term. Different concepts pose a diversified picture 
of democratic habits, history or perceptions of democracy (related to perceptions and 
historical memory compare Tilly in: Schwedler 2006:84). It becomes more difficult to 
find the right approach when talking about failing states. Failing States need some 
stabilisation of the regime and the system before democratisation can be successful. 
Failing states are states with lack of state power, where state institutions are 
ineffective and the state does not reach every part of the country. The Republic of 
Yemen can be seen as such a state – failing. With different clans wanting to reach 
power and controlling parts of the country, widespread violence in the Northern 
provinces and other already named problems.  
 
Concepts of democratisation can pose an escape for the autocratically governed 
Yemen, but needs substantial efforts towards it. Therefore, the central question of the 
paper is: Why is it difficult to democratise Yemen? 
 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis is, that democratisation is very difficult due to various problems in 
Yemen, beginning with different power struggles among tribes and the military, as 
well as with armed groups like the Huthi-rebellion that lead to violence (compare 
International Crisis Group  2009b). Stability problems are influencing the 
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democratisation process, which necessaries new concepts of democratisation based 
on stabilisation of the state.  
The political outcome is dominated by the authoritarian system based on patronage 
networks (and corruption) and small elite ruling. Civil society is expected to work 
within the limits of the authoritarian rule. The solution for those problems is split into 
stabilisation – focus on regime stability and reduced violence - and democratisation – 
focus on political rights, civil rights, and alternation in power - where aspects of both 
contradict each other. For example may a strong unification policy based on a 
capable and powerful government, contradict democratic solutions that focus on 
people’s needs like better infrastructure in the governorates.  Advantages of a 
stronger Salih system would disadvantage more democratic participation. The status 
of a failing states poses problems for the direct democratisation of Yemen. Therefore, 
a combination of stabilisation and democratisation might lead to a positive 
development. Without stabilisation and peacemaking, violence will remain 
challenging for the government’s capacities and for living conditions of the people.  
 
Structure 
The paper starts with methodological considerations. Afterwards theoretic knowledge 
on failed states, democracy, democratisation and democratic peace is outlined, 
before democratic chances for Yemen are retraced through the appliance of factors 
of failed states and of democracy on the case of Yemen. Afterwards, the approach of 
stabilisation is applied by identifying conflicts and outlining ways of solution. 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Elaboration of the problem formulation 
The analysis of the case study is divided into two principal parts: Democratisation 
and Stabilisation (ill.5). Several aspects are used to identify obstacles for 
democratisation. Those are ruling structures, infrastructure and civil society, and 
economic conditions. The influences of each aspect are weighted, while ruling 
structures are expected to be most important for both, democracy and stabilisation, 
because they encompass most of Dahl’s factors for democracy. Robert Dahl 
identified eight factors that are tested in relation to democratisation, namely: freedom 
to establish organisations and become member of those (1), freedom of speech (2), 
right to vote (3), alternation in public offices (4), right for political leaders to struggle 
for support and voters supply (5), alternative information sources (6), free and fair 
elections (7) as well as the referral to elections and voters opinions when applying 
government policies (8). 
Stabilisation focuses on conflicts, international influences and regime stability play an 
important role for its overall stability. Other not identified aspects may influence the 
overall situation but are not focused here. 
 
The analysis of democratisation focuses on three questions. What are the difficulties 
for democratic efforts to change the ruling structures? Ruling structures include 
constitutional settings, elections, the role of the military, tribes, and the influence of 
individual actors.  Dahl’s factors three, four, five, seven and eight are related to the 
ruling structures. 
Why is it so difficult to establish a strong infrastructure and a vital civil society? 
Hindrances within infrastructure and civil society of Yemen might be a loosely 
established civil society, lacking democratic experiences or a history of violence. 
Among others, a low-level educational system with a high illiteracy rate and its effects 
on democratisation and stabilisation will be discussed. The factors identified by Dahl 
that are related to civil society are the factors one, two and six. 
Are there economic hindrances for a transition? Economic development leads not 
directly to democratisation but supports a democratic development (Sandbakken 
2007:136). This is particularly important when hindrances for democracy are 
discussed. It is not part of Dahl’s factors, because Dahl uses a positive approach 
towards democracy. Aspects of a rentier state are named and their influence on the 
transition of Yemen is briefly outlined.  
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The second part focuses on stabilisation. Why is it important to stabilise Yemen in 
order to democratise? Some aspects of the weak state need to be restored before 
democratisation can be successful. This argument is used to resolve problems for 
democratisation that are to be identified. Stabilisation is the second part of the 
analysis. The term stabilisation refers to state building, peacemaking and monitoring 
of settlements as well as stabile ruling structures. Those structures have to be 
democratic if they should benefit the people. Several aspects that are identified 
below hinder the transformation of Yemen into a stable democracy. 
 
As Guggenberger traces the transformation process, the first important issues 
towards democratisation are security and personal survivor, while political rights etc. 
are more important on a higher step (ill.3). Those steps are not necessarily following 
each other, but a bad security situation has strong influences on the output 
legitimation of a regime (e.g. health or educational infrastructure) and affects all other 
aspects of democratisation negatively. It can be assumed that a stabile security 
situation – including the non-existence of civil violence or diseases - is a precondition 
for democratisation (Annan 2005:66f.; UNDP 2009a:2ff.). When one’s life is 
threatened by war, water scarcity or drought, one would hardly think about political 
rights and political influences. Already established institutions and services are 
threatened by conflicts. Warfare is destroying buildings and services and leads to a 
militarization of the society that extracts resources, which are helpful for a successful 
democratisation. Stabilisation can be a first step towards democracy. This is  
contested by scholars of democratic theories and transitions that see steps towards 
democratisation as interchangeable and specific to the country’s situation (Schwedler 
2006:6). As will be shown, the status as a failing state brings problems for direct 
democratisation.  
 
The first part of the theory chapter outlines theoretic approaches towards failed 
states, democracy and democratisation to identify basic influences that are important 
in the case of Yemen before the analysis starts. 
 
2.2 Case 
The paper is a qualitative single case study on the transformation of Yemen into a 
stable and coherent democracy. Qualitative research enables more validity but less 
reliability due to the limited design. This is reflected within the use of sources where 
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diversification should increase reliability.  The main purpose is to identify hindrances 
for a full democratisation of the country. 
 
The case of Yemen has been chosen as the Republic of Yemen showed some 
interesting developments towards democratisation, especially after its unification 
(Schwedler 2006:60). Efforts compromised a strong raise in the number of political 
parties, widely free and fair elections in 1993 and an emerging civil society. 
Afterwards, democracy decreased and the Salih regime and of the parties, the GPC, 
developed into an autocratic direction. The ruling system of Yemen is – following 
several researchers – still seen as partly free and a positive example of democratic 
efforts in the Middle East. The question emerges, why it is difficult to develop a fully 
democratised Yemen. 
 
The case is interesting as Yemen is located in the Middle East where several 
researchers state a lack of democracy and less democratisation than in other parts of 
the developing world (Bromley 1997:323). The Middle East is a region with ongoing 
conflicts like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the situation in Iraq, and the Shia - Sunna 
animosities especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran (International Crisis Group 
2009:5). The case is relevant as an example for failing states and possibilities of 
democratisation as argued by democratic liberalism scholars (Jackson/Sørensen 
2007). Studies on Yemen are, except those of Phillips or Schwedler, relatively rare. 
The question of the exact problems in stabilising and democratising Yemen remains 
slightly researched.Yemen is a republic with around 23 million people – one of the 
largest populations in the Middle East - with a relative low life expectancy (60 years, 
CIA 2009). The case is an example for a worse case in terms of development. The 
case could serve as an example for the possibilities of democratisation in weak 
states. This might enable new programmes towards a successful transition helping to 
stabilise the security situation that affects the region 
 
As failed states are disputed in relation to the “war on terrorism” and as fallback 
position of radical islam” (Schwedler 2006:125), the question of whether Yemen is a 
failing or failed state is particularly relevant.   
 
The Yemeni state is a state in conflict. The war in the Saada region is just a climax of 
the internal power struggles. Yemen managed to develop negotiation rounds and 
conflict settlement for some time since 2003 (see ill.3). The country shows positive 
7 
aspects and bad development. Following the international crisis group, Yemen is a 
“ticking bomb” that might break down (International Crisis Group 2009b). It is 
necessary to develop concepts for the transformation of Yemen into a stable 
democracy. To face the challenge in a region with lot autocracies is a major point of 
research. This paper regards democracy as a desirable and positive and therefore a 
normative concept.  
 
The focus of analysis is national. International factors are regarded with respect to 
their influence on stabilisation and democratisation processes or they are related to 
international economic markets. The local level is not focus of this paper as local 
disparities are strong. Case studies on democratisation give important insights 
towards possibilities of the international community to strengthen democratic 
tendencies. 
 
The stabilisation and democratisation of Yemen is not only of interest for the people 
in Yemen or for the government, but also for the international community. Yemen is a 
state that could easily shift towards a failed state as Foreign Policy recently indicated 
(Foreign Policy 2009b). The Middle East is no stable region. Another failed state 
could easily become a focal point for criminal actors and could spread in the region. 
A destabilisation of the region could easily shift on a higher level, even destabilising 
and changing the international order. Those international interests are not a focus of 
this single case study but show the relevance of the topic. 
 
As a single case study, results of this study are limited to Yemen. A generalisation is 
difficult as every state has different prospects. However, limits of theoretic 
approaches may be identified. Critics argue that democracy is a Western approach 
that is not appropriate for every country (Trotha/Rösel 1999:29f). 
 
The results of the study can be compared with other case studies and give insights 
on problems for democratisation. This paper delivers insights on the relation between 
democratisation and a failed state. 
 
2.3 Variables 
The dependable variable is democratisation in Yemen. This variable is discussed on 
a probable/improbable range. The dependable variable relates to the independent 
variables of ruling structures, Infrastructure and civil society impact, and economic 
situation, as well as on stabilisation factors. The ruling structures might weight more 
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than Infrastructure and civil society factors and civil society factors higher than the 
economic situation, because of the wider scope of ruling structure. The exact 
importance will come clear within the study.  
The performance of Yemen related to democratisation is for those three variables 
discussed on a positive/indifferent/negative range according to Dahl’s factors and 
some other factors for democratisation. Stabilisation is an additional variable that is 
discussed on a supportive/hindering range towards democratisation. 
It is hypothesised that all three variables - ruling structures, Infrastructure and civil 
society impact, and economic situation – are negative towards democratisation and 
that stabilisation problems are hindering the transformation into a democracy. The 
autocratic government of the Salih regime is expected to reach all of the state 
structures, while different factors of poor development are causing negative effects 
on democratisation. The security situation threatens life and makes this a priority. 
 
This paper argues that democratisation necessaries the fulfilment of Dahl’s polyarchy 
factors, which might be influenced by stabilisation of the country. The terms 
polyarchy and democracy are used interchangeable for simplifying the different 
notions explained by Dahl. It is not polyarchy on its own leading to a lasting 
democratisation in Yemen, but rather the combination of democracy and stabilisation. 
Illustration 5 shows the design of the study and its dependencies. The paper includes 
several preconditions and assumptions that may be found as being wrong during the 
paper. I am aware of this problem but negative results can enable a better focus for 
further studies.  
 
The research is exploitative (McGivern 2006). It is ad-hoc research because no 
further research is actually planned.  The focus of analysis lies on qualitative data.  
The study design focuses first on the aspects of democratisation and its problems 
and will then discuss to which degree stabilisation can enable democratisation. 
 
2.4 Sources 
The study relies on secondary sources like the books by Phillips and Schwedler 
(Phillips 2008; Schwedler 2006), the study on democracy performed by the Swedish 
democracy advocacy organisation, IDEA (e.g. Majed 2005), and different articles by 
Carapico and other researchers (Carapico 2007 etc.). Another source is the report of 
the International Crisis Group that gives insights on the actual situation and is policy 
orientated (International Crisis Group 2009). Concerning democratisation Dahl’s book 
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“Democracy and its critics” (Dahl 1989) is a main source as are the much more 
recent works of Grugel and O’Kane. Related to failed states the study relies on 
articles by Rotberg, Risse, Thürer and Ottoway. 
 
The use of indicators of several international organisations, as Freedom House, TI or 
the Failed States Index, is not uncritical and it needs to be assigned, that those 
indicators neglect regional specialities and are published by institutions with an own 
interest. However, they are good orientation points and are a tool for categorisation. 
 
Yemen is mainly regarded by researchers in relation to its status as target and 
“natural heaven” for militant regional para-military groups (including al-Qeda; 
Carapico 2007:153). Other approaches focus on tribes or ethnic cleavages and the 
former North-South divide. It is necessary to state, that a lot of literature can be found 
on behalf of the Yemen before unification and on today’s Yemen in relation to 
terrorism but less on the actual political system and the ruling structure. 
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3. Theory  
The theory chapter provides an outline of the actual knowledge on democracy and 
democratisation and its desirability is explained. The failed states theory that is the 
starting point for the later discussion on possibilities of stabilisation and 
democratisation is explained thereafter. In the end an outline about theoretic 
restrictions of democratisation in failing states that cause the combination with 
stabilisation is given.  
 
3.1 Democractic theories 
This section explains the concepts of democracy, democratic liberalism and 
democratisation and their connection to failed states.  The sub questions for this part 
are:  What is democracy? What are essential elements of democracy? Why is 
democracy desirable, especially in connection with international relations? What is 
democratisation?  
 
3.1.1 Democracy 
The concept of democracy is contested4. Different researchers see various factors as 
necessary conditions for democracy. Furthermore, the perception of democracy is 
strongly influenced by liberal democracy (Grugel 2002:17). 
 
Core elements of democracy 
Democracy is a generic term, describing a variety of political systems, which are 
signified as „government of the people, by the people and for the people“(Lincoln 
cited in Schmidt 2004:147.). Democracy is a form of decision finding through 
collectively binding rules that are controlled by the people (Dahl 1989:107; Abromeit 
2002:69). Core elements of liberal democracy are elections (and the choice between 
alternatives), representation with binding rules based on equity, pluralism and 
tolerance, as well as freedom of association and, freedom of speech, self-
determination and responsibility5. The protection of individual rights is, as argued by 
several researchers, the instrument for individual auspiciousness to achieve overall 
satisfaction of the population (Dahl 1989:94). Other researchers emphasise fairness 
and justice or the reflection and deliberation as decisive factors for democracy 
(Abromeit 2002:166f.; Dahl 1989:91 a. 93). There is continuous interest in a minimal 
                                                 
4
 related to the discourse on democracy see also: Croissant 2002:17 
5
 See also the approaches of Moore, Tocqueville and Held, compare: O’Kane 2004:11 a. 26; Bobbio 
1988:10; for self-determination and protection of right: Dahl 1989:88f.; further approaches: Bauzon 
1992:16.  
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definition of democracy:  Researchers normally focus on fair and secret elections and 
universal franchise, as well as on guarantees of political freedoms and political rights 
while proceduality and context dependency are underlined6.  
 
Within democratic systems, institutions are catalysts for the participation of people 
(Grugel 2002:7). Institutions varied over time and resulted in a variety of political 
systems (e.g. federal or presidential). Democracies differ also between participation 
and efficiency or output- and input legitimacy (Abromeit 2002:15). 
 
Dahl’s approach 
The variety of approaches makes it difficult to identify one far reaching definition of 
democracy. Following, the approach of Dahl that emancipates itself from the term 
democracy and that introduces the term of polyarchy is applied7. 
The polyarchy approach is based on the following factors: freedom to establish 
organisations and to become member of those (1), freedom of speech (2), right to 
vote (3), alternation in public offices (4), right for political leaders to struggle for 
support and voters supply (5),  alternative information sources (6), free and fair 
elections (7) as well as the referral to elections and voters opinions when applying 
government policies(8) (Dahl following O’Kane 2004:24; Grugel 2002:19). A 
democratic system represents those factors best.  The approach of Dahl is used to 
identify whether the Yemeni system is democratic and to elaborate problems for 
democracy. It is one of the clearest “minimal definition” approaches for democracy. 
 
Challenges for democracy 
Globalisation, conflicts between participation and representation, the qualifications of 
the population (political education), the role and over-emphasize of elections and the 
narrow border towards autocracies that diminish the visibility of differences are 
challenges for democracy8. Especially the visibility to grey-zone regimes are 
challenging and are used by autocratic leaders to enable only controlled and 
channelled opposition (Schwedler 2006:34). The variety of factors and the grown 
number of regime types make clear distinctions between democracies and 
                                                 
6
 For an overview on different approaches: O’Kane 2004:23; Abromeit 2002: 165ff. 
7
 The explanation for polyarchy bases on the difference between democratic ideals and real 
democracy (Bobbio 1988: 12ff.). 
8
 Concerning globalisation: McGrew 2000:407; concerning counterarguments against the idea of 
representation (representation as filter for opinions): Abromeit 2002:78; concerning qualification of the 
population: Dahl 1989:97; concerning the overemphasising of elections: Grugel 2002:22; concerning 
the difficulties in distinction between regime types: O’Kane 2004:3 and Croissant 2002:12ff.  
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autocracies more difficult. Furthermore, democracy is often regarded as a Western 
ideal that is applied on other countries and regions based on this image (Grugel 
2002:21). Another condition for democracy is a clear defined state (/nation) with 
undisputed borders (Hippler 2005:3; Abromeit 2002:116). This condition is 
questioned by increased loss of closed statehood. 
 
3.1.2 Democratic liberalism 
International and national actors regard democratic peace as point of departure for 
democratisation.  It explains why democracy is desirable. 
 
Democratic peace refers – as a form of liberalism (theory of International Relations) – 
to the individual, to freedom, participation and auspiciousness. Positions held by 
states in international relations refer to internal factors (Krell 2004:182f.). Liberalism 
tries to retrace state actions to societal structures, processes and interests (Schieder 
2006:176). Liberal theories are opposed to realist theories because of their different 
point of departure in positivist thinking and in the level of analysis (Jackson/ 
Sørensen 2007:115). The necessary of guaranteeing human rights etc. derives from 
fundamental obligations of human beings (Jackson/ Sørensen 2007:148). 
 
The variant of democratic liberalism or republican liberalism focuses on the peace-
enforcing function of democracy and thereby on theories of democratic peace 
(Czempiel 1998; Williams 2001:531ff.). Following theories of democratic peace, the 
system of rule – that relies on grades of participation and values (Krell 2004:195 a. 
198)9 – decides how states act. It is assumed that democracies are not willing to 
begin wars, because their citizens regard war as principally negative and because 
their will determines the actual policies (Jackson/Sørensen 2007:111). This thesis 
has been modified so far that democracies are not going to war against each other. 
Empiric research showed, that democracies are not less war prone than other 
systems but that a democracy does not fight another democracy (Axworthy 
1992:114; Geis/Brock/Mueller 2007:157ff.). Researchers argue, that democracies 
hold common moral values like in the case of Kant's “pacific union” or regard 
themselves as “doves” (Jackson/ Sørensen 2007:111; Starr 1992:207). The last 
argument of the democratic peace focuses on the economic relations that are 
strengthened by interdependence between democracies that makes it unlike – 
                                                 
9
 concerning the relation between state interest and democracy compare Keohane 2000:115. 
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because of negative economic causes – that democracies go to war against each 
other (Jackson/ Sørensen 2007:112).  
 
3.1.3 Democratisation 
Apart from democracy, aspects and stages of democratisation became an important 
field of research. This became necessary as transition scholars had to state, that not 
all aspects of democracy lead automatically to democratisation but to regimes 
between democracy and authoritarianism. Democracy is a concept while 
democratisation focuses on the process of the implementation of democracy. 
 
Democratisation 
Democratisation is a long-term economic, societal and political transformation 
process (Ottoway 2007:365; Grugel 2002:1). It describes the transformation of a non-
democratic system into a responsible and representative form of government (Potter 
1997:3).  Democratisation is like democracy a contested concept (Sandbakken 
2007:136).  
 
A minimal definition of democratisation encompasses the introduction of fair elections 
without fraud and of basic norms hat enable democracy while broader approaches 
include also individual rights and polyarchic government (Grugel 2002:5). Polyarchic 
government would furthermore include the alternation of power, alternative 
information sources or the referral to the voters supply. 
 
Democratisation is divided into different stages as argued by several researchers 
(view illustration 4 and Vanhanen 1992:165), which are not necessarily chronological, 
but might jump in the one or the other direction (Schwedler 2006:6).  On the other 
hand does not exist any model for predictable stages across cases because of their 
variance (Schwedler 2006:4).  The stage model is more likely to be an orientation 
than a clear model. The actual concept depends on regional circumstances. 
 
Different aspects of democratisation 
As various researchers refer to miscellaneous aspects as dominant parts for 
democratisation, some aspects will be presented: First, the differentiation between 
bottom-up and top-down approach (Gillespie/Youngs 2002:3). Democratisation 
necessaries the motivation of the people for it (Hinnebusch 2006:377). Following 
Linz, democratisation needs generally the support for the principal ideas of the 
regime and for the realisation of the political output (Kotzé/Garcia-Rivero 2006:328f.). 
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Civil society and individual engagement are a further fundamental element of 
democracy (Putnam in O’Kane 2004:35f.). Supplementary, institutionalisation is an 
important factor of democracy: Without efficient and legitimate institutionalisation 
remains every democratisation unsuccessful, even if a democratic culture exists 
(Kotzé/Garcia-Rivero 2006:331f; Croissant 2002:23).  That includes demands for a 
stabile statehood as a condition for democracy (Ottoway 2007:375). Furthermore, 
Vanhanen underlines the influence of political leadership (Vanhanen 1992:157). The 
economic level influences democratisation. Nevertheless, economic liberalisation 
does not necessarily lead towards more democracy, but can enforce authoritarian 
structures (Hinnebusch 2006:384f.). Economic development can have a positive 
effect on democratisation while this relationship is not causal (Sandbakken 
2007:136).  
 
Regarding power structure, a widespread diversification of power resources is seen 
as condition for a successful democracy – the more spread the resources, the more 
successful the democratisation (Croissant 2002:24). Furthermore, a „window of 
opportunity“can pose a unique chance towards democratisation based on special 
conditions (Arenhövel 2002:176).  
 
Change of existing structures and challenges 
The transition towards democracy means a change of existing structures  and 
democratisation efforts are destabilising at the beginning, because only few actors 
are convinced of democracy and compromises need to be made (O’Kane 2004:30). 
Existing authoritarian structures and traditions are often defended. Therefore, some 
researchers argue that democracies without parties, tribal presidents or elder’s 
councils are important and necessary structures of democratisation that can build 
stability (Rösel 1999:94f.; Klemp/Poeschke 2005:22) Democratisation begins 
normally not at the state-level or by the government, but bases on a self-
democratisation by the people (Quaritsch 1976: 32). However, security policies, 
geostrategies or economic relations can undermine international efforts for 
democratisation (Faath 2005a:35). Furthermore, Western models of democracy are 
not suitable for every system, because it bases on a centralised, culturally 
homogenate state and they can be perceived as neo-colonialism (Trotha/Rösel 
1999:19 a. 29f; Faath 2005b:16). Various researchers refer to the uniqueness of 
democratisation in Europe with different directions of development and with different 
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ideas that were not only a story of success but also of failure (Kaelble 2002).  
International influence through diplomatic pressure on processes of democratisation 
varies by regional circumstances, but can direct governments in one desired direction 
(Ottaway 2007:375). External democratisation, which only focuses on elections and 
is accompanied by inconsistent democratisation policies, is rarely successful, but can 
rather support the development of hybrid regimes that focus on electoral fraud 
(Levitsky/Way 2005:5f.).  
 
The question of regional and cultural restrictions 
Some researchers see democracy as hindered by regional restrictions or cultural 
circumstances like Islam10. As shown by various researchers, Islam evolved into very 
different forms depending on the social and historical context (Bromley 1997:332).  
Obstacles for democracy In the Middle East are summarised by Bromley as factors 
like abundant, large-scale landed classes based on subordinated peasantry, 
imperialist influence, and a strong role for state in economic and political 
development (Bromley 1997:342). This means that other factors than Islam are of 
importance. Especially the aspect of the rentier state, a state that gets more than 
40% of its GDP from rents (oil or remittances) and where the regime gets these 
“ungained” resources, and the aspect of patronage or clientele systems are 
emphasised (Phillips 2008:23; Sivan 2000:74f.). 
 
Examinations of the relation of Islam and democracy have shown that Islamic culture 
can be “congenial and uncongenial towards democracy” (Ayubi 1997:362). Even 
Islamists show differences in their worldviews making distinctions like between 
moderate and radical Islam more narrow (Schwedler 2006:120 a. 125). Therefore, 
Islamists should be seen as normal political actors.  
 
Hindrances for democratisation 
Overall, researchers see hindrances for democratisation in strong states, which work 
against democracy – especially patrimonial states -, in elite opposition, in non-
democratic cultures, in problems with institutional reforms, in nationality or identity 
problems, in reduced sovereignty and weak state capacities as well as in problems 
with the economic reform (O’Kane 2004:31; Rejne/Rouverouy van Nieuwaal 
1999:177). Other problematic aspects are fighting groups, remaining ethnic or 
religious cleavages or a missing common identity and a lack of tolerance (Ottoway 
                                                 
10
 For a detailed list of factors for Arab “Exeptionalism” see Phillips 2008:23. 
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2007:367 a. 372; Grugel 2002:5). Problems emerge, when democratisation is 
enforced on a short-term period by liberalisation, elections and consolidation 
(Ottoway 2007:366 a. 375).  
 
3.1.4 Democratic theories 
Democracy is a process, which is signified by a plurality of factors that make 
democracy better or worse based on the intensity of their implementation. 
Democracy has not one form, but several. Dahl’s factors are seen to be far-reaching 
and are therefore used for analysing democracy. 
 
The theory of democratic liberalism shows the desirability of democracy as state 
system and is a normative theory. The main finding is that democracies do not wage 
war against each other apart from the positive aspects for the population. 
 
Democratisation is a long-term transition of an autocratic regime into a democratic 
one. It can focus on several internal aspects like distribution of power, political history 
or civil society among other. It is not only one factor that is decisive, but also several 
ones. Dahl’s factors are dealing with most of the aspects of democratisation. 
However, it is a positive approach and research on democratisation suggests that 
economic influences, social conflicts or fighting groups have negative towards 
democratisation. The combination of Dahl’s factors and economic influences is the 
tool of analysis in this paper. 
 
It needs to be considered, that democratisation is a normative concept and not only 
several politicians but also researchers “desire to see more states democratize” 
(Schwedler 2006:4).  
 
3.2 Failing and failed states 
3.2.1 State failure 
This part examines what failed states are and how they can be characterised. 
 
Definition of failed states 
Failed states are characterised by descending internal and external state legitimacy, 
by weak societal solidarity and by reduced functions and capabilities of action. This is 
related to the reduced/lacking monopoly of force and of political power control, and to 
the limited rule of law that cause destabilisation of neighbour states or even of the 
international community (Rotberg 2002:127; Thürer 2008:42f.). 
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Failed states are the extreme form of failing states, where the state system is no 
longer functional and – at best – where only some institutional structures remain. 
Failed states are an extreme form of failing states. Every failing state has signs of 
failed states. The lack of state monopoly of force leads to open spaces for war affine 
non-state actors (Stott 2007:3). That leads to stability problems in the region and to 
fallback positions for terrorist networks (Schneckener 2005:26). Therefore, failed 
states are regarded as a new topic for sovereignty research in IR (Jackson/ 
Sørensen 2007:169f.).  An example for a failed state is Somalia11. External actors 
like other states or military groups gain the capacity to influence purposeful the 
autonomy of the state and can change the attitude of individual actors (Krasner 
2000:126). Conflicts emerge between the state and armed groups as well as 
between armed groups – those are not even limited to boundaries (Vinci 2008:310). 
As Jackson and Sørensen pointed out, the actual international system “supports the 
survival of weak states” because failed states are still recognised as states (Jackson/ 
Sørensen 2007:270). 
  
The debate on failed states has been influenced by the “war on terrorism”, the 
fallback position of terrorists in failed states and their relation to radical Islam 
(Schwedler 2006:125). 
 
Indicators 
Failed States are dangerous and are signified by a large scale of criminal and 
political violence as well as by a delegitimation of the state and by a loss of control 
over territories. There exist increasing ethnic, regional, linguistic and cultural 
hostilities or civil war. Institutions are weak and infrastructure is lacking. Human 
development indicators are bad and the food situation is insufficient.  Elites are 
fragmented, the rule of law not functioning and the GDP decreased while the overall 
economic situation is bad (all factors: Rotberg 2002:129; Thürer 2008:45). Overall, all 
state functions are reduced.  
 
In failed states, the state is nearly not present in rural areas, because it is more 
probable that the state as well as other actors will focus on different cities (Debiel 
2005:16).  Para-military groups or warlords are able to construct their own structures 
in failed or failing states. Those may be financially and politically linked with the 
                                                 
11
 for a list of actual failing and failed states, see: Foreign Policy 2009b. 
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international system without being restricted by the state (Vinci 2008:295). Ottoway 
underlines, that precare states cannot be stabilised through simple democratisation 
(Ottoway 2007:377).  
 
Reasons for state failure are various not homogenise factors that differ in their 
influence related to geographic, physical, historic or political conditions. Following 
Rotberg, human factors like corrupt presidents play a crucial role for state failure 
(Rotberg 2002:127). Failed states leave their territory ungoverned, while the 
international system still relies on sovereignty and the implementation of the 
monopoly of power (Rotberg 2002:127).  
 
Rebuilding statehood 
Thürer shows two possibilities of rebuilding statehood: the construction of a strong 
state – the Leviathan – and the reconstruction of the state by a people directed 
bottom-up approach (self-instauration by the civil society) (Thürer 2008:45). Both 
forms of nation building cannot be realised in its pure form and the possibility of the 
Leviathan is to refuse for humanitarian reasons (Thürer 2008:45).  
 
Fragile states are not able to guarantee the necessary output-legitimacy. Recently, 
wars became privatised and commercialised and actors that do not have any interest 
in peaceful conflict solution and democratic practices filled the space of the failing 
state (Schneckener 2005:28f). There is a difference between fragile and failed states, 
as the first one has at least some remaining structures, while the latter is open space 
of violence (Schneckener 2005:29f.). Violent actors should not be excluded of 
negotiations but must be viewed within their structures as powerful actors (Stott 
2007:13ff.). In failed states powerful war affine actors are important partners for 
conflict solutions. States’ functions are also to deliver public goods that are normally 
not provided by private firms and to regulate the internal market. This is no longer 
true for failed states (Risse 2005:7).   
 
Rotberg's perspective focuses on nation building to help failed states and underlines 
the long time frame of building resources and capacities (Rotberg 2002:130). The 
total reconstruction of a country is costly and necessaries strong initiatives from 
abroad, as failed states cannot act on their own (Ottoway 2007:375).  
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Conclusion for failing and failed states 
Failed states challenge the capacity of the democracy. As will be shown, Yemen 
shows indicators of a failing state.  Failed states are states with a lack of authority 
over their territory and their people. Those states are the extreme form of failing 
states and are signified by increased violence. Failed States do not have the 
capability to provide basic services to their citizens and are often socially divided.  
 
3.2.2 Failing States and democracy 
The compatibility of democracy and failing states is to be discussed because some 
aspects of failed or failing states oppose democratisation.  
 
Dahl and failing states 
According to the eight factors identified by Dahl is explained if democracy can be 
reached in failing states. The extreme of the failed state is not the actual status of 
Yemen, but the country is not far from it. 
 
In failing states is the freedom of association dependent on the power of other actors 
than the state (1). The state can no longer fully guarantee this liberty and the 
willingness of other actors to allow this is dependent on their fear for their power 
position. Ruling war-actors or e.g. tribes can principally oppose the foundation of 
organisations. Is the space without control, exists the freedom of association, but 
there is nobody who guarantees it. Otherwise is the interest in associations possibly 
low if the own survivor is threatened. This is only particularly true for failing states, 
where at least in some regions a state authority can guarantee rights like in the case 
of Yemen. It is nearly similar for the freedom of speech (2). This one cannot be 
guaranteed by anyone and it lacks a broader publicity in failed states. The publicity 
can be reduced through illiteracy or lacking communication structures. The freedom 
of speech is possibly not the most important aim if the own survivor is threatened. 
However, in failing states might exist some freedom of speech as long as it does not 
harm the ruling actors.The right to vote (3) in failing states is only partly guaranteed. 
Institutions for the election are weak or not existent. Corruption and patrimonial 
systems cause - in the case of elections - doubtful results.  A possibility for elections 
is a democratisation in a limited space – e.g. on a local level. The possibility of a local 
polis might seem less harmful to powerful actors. 
The possibility for alternation in offices (4) is not given because of limited statehood. 
Furthermore, even if there are alternatives, those might be strongly dominated by 
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patrimonial networks or violent actors that replace the state. The concurrence of 
political leaders for support and votes (5) is – if elections are possible – not without 
violence and at the end, the most powerful actors takes the victory.  The perception 
of democratic practices is not elaborated. The state is not capable to cover all 
regions of its territory.Alternative sources for information (6) are in failing or failed 
states only existent in a limited form. Even if they exist, it is more as doubtful if more 
than one source of information exists. Violent actors do not have an interest in 
alternative sources information sources, if they do not serve their interests. A form of 
national publicity is therefore not possible.  Free and fair elections (7) are hindered by 
lacking neutrality, a lacking publicity, missing institutions and the desire to maintain 
power by the actors who rule. The most powerful actor determines the outcome of 
the election. Governmental programmes and the referral to the will of the population 
(8) – even if they exist and are the will of the population - can only be implemented, if 
powerful actors agree and will only be fully implemented if the lacking or reduced 
monopoly of power will be restored.  
 
Conclusion for failed states and democracy 
Failing states lack diverse preconditions for democracy and hinder democratisation 
on a state level. Hypothetically, a local democratisation – e.g. through democratically 
elected principles that are responsible for land use or food distribution- is possible. 
Another way of enabling democratisation is to restore statehood. This necessaries 
the involvement of the conflict parties, international actors - that are involved in the 
conflict or can be regarded as mediators -, economic and infrastructural development 
and the overall regime stability 
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4. Yemen’s situation 
This chapter outlines the actual situation of Yemen, starting with a short introduction 
of the historical background. Then, the sub questions do the ruling structures, does 
the civil society structure and does the economic situation hinder democratisation, 
will be answered. The status of Yemen as a failing state is analysed and the 
prospects for stabilisation are identified in the second part of this chapter. 
Democratisation and stabilisation are different foci that are regarded separately at 
first. Both may be influencing each other because they have the same orientation 
points in the political system. 
 
Brief history of Yemen 
This paper concentrates on the Yemen after unification and does not regard the long 
Yemeni history in the Arab world (Bruck 2005a:2). 
 
The republic of Yemen was until 1990 separated into two countries. A socialist 
Southern part and a Northern part, that was tribally orientated. Both countries 
clashed some times, but dialogue continued albeit severe conflicts and finally led to 
the unification of both states (Majed 2005). The end of the Cold War led to a new 
situation for both countries because of the changes in the international system. Both 
sites, neither Northern nor Southern Yemen had a democratic experience before 
unification and the democratic shift came rather surprising (Schwedler 2006:57 a. 
59). The original drafts for the constitution of 1990 only saw a limited space for 
political pluralism and there were several objections to free media or party pluralism 
(al-Kamim 2005:54; al-Mikhlafi 2005:90). The existing actors agreed to party 
pluralism and power-sharing because it was the best alternative and was expected to 
oppose the dominance by one actor (Day 2006:122). The exact reason might been 
influenced by the international donor community – more democracy more 
grants/loans- but this is hardly to be proven.  
 
However, political actors used this window of opportunity of the unification 
constitution to make party pluralism real. In the words of Schwedler, the openings 
were “remarkable” and security, political, financial and legal controls were reduced 
and freedoms and rights were guaranteed while public debates emerged all over the 
country (Schwedler 2006:60;Phillips 2008:2). “Dozens” of newspapers emerged and 
46 parties registered for the elections of 1993 (Schwedler 2006:60). 
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The first free parliamentary elections in 1993 were won by the GPC (123 seats), in 
front of the Islah (64 seats) and the YSP (56 seats) as well as in front of five other 
parties (twelve seats; Day 2006:123). The YSP, the only party of former South 
Yemen, was slightly discontent with its performance but joined the agreed coalition of 
the GPC and YSP. However, the GPC decided to include the Islah in the government 
for the frustration of the YSP. Some members of the Islah were related to president 
Salih and the president ensured a “de facto political authority [...] through patronage, 
granting of economic favours, and the allocation of prominent government positions, 
resources, and salaries to tribal sheikhs and other clients” (Schwedler 2006:61).The 
limited success for the YSP is partly explained because of the lower share of 
Southern population in the unified Yemen. The South had less than a fifth of the 
population of unified Yemen (Schwedler 2006:60).   
 
Soon after unification a Southern separatist movement started a secession 
movement with fighting in 1994 and was finally defeated (Majed 2005; Schwedler 
2006:62). Other researchers argue that the Northern government encouraged the 
military solution, which resulted in the civil war. The exact origins of the conflict are 
contested, but the regional division of the country and the exacerbation of group 
divisions where important aspects (Day 2006:121). This civil war lasted for 143 days 
and forced over 7.000 deaths (Sarkees 2000). YSP leaders became targets of 
assassinations (some by GPC members and militant Islamists) and around 100 
leaders and members were killed during the transition period until 1994 (Schwedler 
2006:62). After the defeat, the GPC used its parliamentary majority for becoming the 
dominant party. 
 
4.1  An outline for democratisation 
The analysis chapter asks, whether ruling structures, civil society or economic factors 
hinder democratisation. This is analysed by testing the factors identified by Dahl and 
by using economic hindrances as additional factors that should enable a more 
detailed view on the case of Yemen. 
 
4.1.1 Ruling Structures 
The main factors for democracy identified by Dahl, that relate to the ruling structures, 
are the right to vote (3), alternation in offices (4), the right for political leaders to 
struggle for support and voters supply (5), free and fair elections (7) and the referral 
to elections and voters options when applying government policies (8).  
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As Carapico points out, Yemen is a relatively young state that emerged out of North 
and South Yemen that had diverse political systems (Carapico 2007:154). The actual 
political system is a republic, which claims to be democratic, but in fact is far from 
being democratic e.g. in the minimal definition of free and fair elections (Schwedler 
2006:2). The governments’ central authority and legitimacy is still contested 
(Carapico 2007:155).   
 
The model of democratisation for the case of Yemen had been top-down and did not 
contain greater involvement of citizens (Schwedler 2006:76). The democratisation 
was introduced by the elites and not through people’s pressure. This questions the 
people’s desire for democracy. Representation was of less concern than the building 
of a central state, which could rule in areas of tribal influence (Schwedler 2006:135). 
The system of the regime is one that does not eliminate its enemies, but that co-opts 
and coerces the other party and enhances its own legitimacy (Phillips 2008:7). 
Legitimacy is claimed in connection with more progress that is suggested to be 
achieved or by emphasising more negative alternatives (Phillips 2008:7). 
 
The system was changed in 2001 with the amendment of the constitution and the  
creation of the Shura-council, the introduction of the vice-president, the direct 
election of the president and the extension of the term for president and for the 
Chamber of Deputies (Mashhur 2005:27f.). The extension of the term for the 
president and the assembly is less democratic than before as well as the shura-
council is not democratically elected. The constitutional amendment of 2001 
“weakens hope in the possibility of a peaceful transition of power” because the 
presidential term and the term of the Chamber of Deputies were extended and a 
presidential election was cancelled (al-Mikhlafi 2005:102). Although the original 
provisions of the constitution were perceived as democratic, the amendments were a 
step towards more autocracy, because it opposes alternation in office.  The rule of 
the president is a dominant one in the Yemeni system. 
 
The president 
The head of state is the president, namely Ali Abdallah Salih, who has ruled since 
1990 and who was the former president of Northern Yemen. He has the most 
important position in the Yemeni system (ill.6). 
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The head of government is the prime minister, actually Maj. Gen. Abd al-Rab Mansur 
al-Hadi (CIA 2009). The president who is directly elected for 7 years (last election 
2006, next in 2013, CIA 2009) designates both the Vice-president and the prime 
minister.  
 
Ali Abdallah Salih has been elected in the last presidential polls with 77.2% percent 
of the votes against Faysal bin Shamlan (21.8%; CIA 2009). President Salih already 
won the 1999 elections after an YSP candidate was disqualified by the parliament 
and against another GPC-candidate (Sivan 2000:69). President Salih will have lead 
Yemen - including his actual term - for 23 years and already ruled in North Yemen for 
12 years (Schwedler 2006:63). This underlines the presidential desire for power. His 
son, Ahmad, becomes more active on the political stage and is expected to become 
the next president of Yemen (Schwedler 2006:63).  
There was no alternation in presidential office since president Salih became 
president. This underlines the autocratic tendency. The president distributes 
government contracts, licenses for economic commons and allocates smuggling 
rings in its patronage system (Phillips 2008:4). The inner circle of dominant members 
is relatively small and consists of elites from the Sanhan tribe, the Hashid tribe and of 
military officers and others that are loyal to the president (Phillips 2008:4). The 
president built its network of power by incorporating miscellaneous power groups. As 
Schwedler points out, the president has close ties with the Saudi government that 
ensures a financial support for the government (Schwedler 2006:72). 
 
However, the president refers to democracy, national unity and unification as a key 
element of Yemen and refers regularly to reforms (Day 2006:123; Schwedler 
2006:179). According to Schwedler, this might strengthen the democratic narrative in 
the country and can thus have a positive impact on the public political space 
(Schwedler 2006:129). On the contrary, Day argues that within elite circles, 
democratisation is seen as an obstacle for stability and national unity (Day 
2006:132).  
 
The president and related individuals play an important role in the Yemeni system. 
Democratic bodies like the parliament are not responsible for alternation in office. 
Rhetorically the president tries to refer to public desires, but does not rely on it. 
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The legislative 
Democratic theories of republic democracy would expect that the legislative is the 
main body that decides over policies.  The legislative branch consists of a shura 
council of 111 delegates that are appointed by the president and of an assembly of 
301 delegates that are elected by popular vote for five years (last election 2003; CIA 
2009). The parliamentary elections of April 2009 had been postponed for two years 
by agreement of the president and the opposition to remove one trigger of war 
(International Crisis Group 2009:25).  
In Islamic teaching, interpretations exist that see the advice and opinions (shura) as 
essential element of democracy in Islam while other interpretations see the ruler 
independent of shura (Ayubi 1997:349). The council undermines democracy in the 
Yemeni case. The council is not democratically elected, but is appointed by the 
president. This leads to the extension of patronage positions. Alternation in office is 
dependent on the president and political members of the shura council will not have 
to struggle for political support of the people. 
 
The assembly is assumed to be a more democratic element because the people 
elect it.  In the 2003 assembly elections, the GPC gained 228 seats, the Islah 47, the 
YSP 7, the Nasserite Unionist Party 3, the National Arab Socialist Ba'th Party 2 and 
independents 14 seats (CIA 2009). This means, that the GPC holds the three-quarter 
majority needed in legislature to rule as it pleases and the overall trend of the last 
elections is towards a one dominant party system (Majed 2005:17). 
The parliament is relatively effective in bringing the public opinion to the leaders and 
is so an early warning system for the government (Phillips 2008:66). There is some 
referral to the desires of the people within the parliament. The overall position of the 
parliament is reduced through the strength of a particular party, namely the GPC, and 
the position in the Yemeni system. In addition, formal rules are ignored like in the 
case of national budget. Parliamentarian supervisory on the national budget is weak 
and the accepted finances vary from the final budgets (Phillips 2008:75). Phillips 
underlines that the capacity of parliament is limited due to restrictions of 
infrastructure and staff which often results in informal funding (Phillips 2008:83).  
 
Members of parliament see themselves as powerless (Phillips 2008:80).  Due to 
contestable voting results in a not free vote, the GPC became the main actor in 
parliament. International observers reported infractions like intimidations and threats 
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by activist of the GPC against others and intervention of security agencies in the 
voting process (al-Mikhlafi 2005:102; Day 2006:128). Cheating in the election 
process also includes “’travelling’ voting blocks” like public service employees, 
removing competitors in certain district where government or tribal affiliations are 
weak, registration of individuals in more than one district or registration of under-aged 
individuals and voting in the name of deceased or absent people (al-Mikhlafi  
2005:108). Majed underlines that the GPC openly violates the constitution by 
postponing presidential elections, by allowing the president to serve more than two 
terms among other factors (Majed 2005:21). 
 
Political parties 
Article 5 and Article 41 of the constitution state, that the Yemeni system is based on 
political and party pluralism as well as guarantees of freedom and personal liberties 
(Mashhur 2005:28). 
 
The constitution states that parties cannot be based on regional, tribal, sectarian, 
family or vocational affiliation and that the parties’ principal  objectives cannot 
contradict Islamic faith (Majed 2005:16). A great number of founders and supporters 
restrict the creation of new parties and the listing as independent candidate (Mashhul 
2005:37). Overall, it is relatively normal, that political parties are to some extend 
restricted. Regional parties could win at least some seats but contradict an ideal of 
national unity. 
 
The opposition formed a Joint Meeting Parties to build a unified front against the 
Salih regime that frequently played groups off against each other (Browers 
2007:566). Before the 2006 elections the JMP increasingly cooperated and acted 
more openly due to problems of the regime (Phillips 2008:62). A weakening of the 
regime enhances therefore the democratic performance. As Phillips points out, the 
Yemeni opposition is only challenging the government to the point where both actors 
clash and pulls then back; making an alternation in power improbable on the short 
term (Phillips 2008:168) 
 
Some researchers underline, that party pluralism is a new concept in Yemen (al-
Mikhlafi 2005:90). Most Yemeni parties lack internal democratic methods, which lead 
to a strong division between members and a fragmentation of parties that absolutely 
weakens their role (al-Kamim 2005:77). It is to underline, that liberalisation projects of 
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the authoritarian regime are managed as controlled openings and will be compatible 
with interests of the regime as Schwedler argues (Schwedler 2006:37). The regime 
“manipulates” the outcome of the system towards its desired direction. Political 
agreements are often achieved based on a wide range of actors, that might be 
concerned by a problem, but are not democratically established (Schwedler 
2006:38). The right for political associations exists, but the effectiveness of parties is 
slightly reduced because the outcome is not only dominated by one party, but by the 
institutional dominance and influence of patronage networks. 
Two main political parties are the GPC and the Islah that will be analysed. 
 
The GPC 
The greatest party – the “state party” – is the GPC, a coalition of political and tribal 
authorities, the military and various other security institutions (Majed 2005:15).  The 
GPC was founded in Northern Yemen in 1978 as a national assembly under the rule 
of president Salih and was used as relation between the presidential regime and 
local elites around the country (Schwedler 2006:58).  Local actors became member 
of the national assembly and could therefore show their position and articulate their 
interests to the president.   
 
Today, the GPC lends support to the president and his will but also to the elites with 
whom he consults and is not ideological coherent (Browers 2007:567). The 
membership in the GPC does not mean that every GPC member is part of the 
regime, but that not GPC members are part of it (like Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-
Ahmar; Phillips 2008:52). Furthermore, the GPC has access to resources of the state 
and Phillips argues that its power position would cease without this (Phillips 
2008:52). 
 
However, there had been protests of GPC members against governmental decisions 
like in 2005 where members of parliament criticised the sell of an oil concession 
below market price, at the end without success (Phillips 2008:82). Normally, a GPC 
member that critics the executive on sensible issues will be punished, through 
humiliation or by freezing finances (Phillips 2008:80). 
 
The Islah  
The Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Tajamma’al-Yamani li al-Islah) or short Islah 
is an Islamist party (Schwedler 2006:2). It has become the main opposition party 
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although the term opposition is sometimes ambiguous because some “party 
members” are part of the Salih network. The Islah was founded after unification in 
1990 and included a wide range of actors (Schwedler 2006:71 a.89). It consists of a 
“tribal” and a “religious” branch while the overall party is less cohesive and is more 
dependent on “internal dynamics” than on this distinction between branches 
(Schwedler 2006:71)12. The most powerful actor within Islah is Shaeikh Ab'd Allah 
who has strong ties with the president (Day 2006:126). After its foundation, the Islah 
strongly opposed the YSP (Browers 2007:568). 
 
Before the Islah was founded, there had been no tradition of opposing the authority 
of the regime, but members were rather supportive for it (Schwedler 2006:64). The 
Islah furthermore supported the government militarily and ideological in the civil war 
of 1994 (Hamidi 2009:167).  Recently, there are cases were the Islah took an 
opposed position. The Islah opposed the Aden Free Trade Zone because it would 
attract large numbers of foreigners to the country and this could undermine the 
Islamic identity (Phillips 2008:141). 
 
The religious or ideological wing consists of radical followers of al-Zindani and his 
Salafi teachings, of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabis, some Zaydis 
and smaller groups (Schwedler 2006:72). Notably al-Zindani has close ties to Saudi 
Arabia and controls some Islamist institutes within the country and holds business 
investments (Schwedler 2006:72).  
 
Islah members are expected to control some part the nomination of Imams in 
mosques (Knysh 2001:405). The Islah has a broad system of regional offices based 
on the loose Brotherhood structures before unification and the party originally grew in 
former YSP dominated districts (Schwedler 2006:90).  
The Islah had organised rallies, demonstrations or local gatherings for mobilisation of 
citizens around some issues (Schwedler 2006:94). This is some form of democratic 
activity. The party is not cohesive and has no centralized power while individuals like 
Sheikh Ab'd Allah and al-Zindani aligns themselves to the party if it suits their 
interests (Schwedler 2006:96). 
 
The Islah was in power after the first elections of 1993 until the GPC won the 
absolute majority in 2003. Islah ministers were soon faced with overstaffed 
                                                 
12
 For another differentiation between modernist, traditional and liberal wing compare: Browers 
2007:575. 
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bureaucracies of their ministers (Schwedler 2006:104). After the 1993 elections, Islah 
had primarily service ministries and it was speculated, “Islah had been set up to fail”, 
consequently, several ministers resigned (Schwedler 2006:104f.). Service ministries 
are more difficult to handle, because infrastructural conditions are severe and 
ministries have more staff than necessary because of patronage systems. 
 
Schwedler argues that some Islah leaders only adopted democratic rhetoric for 
strategic interests while others were willing to explore democracy and others refused 
entirely the concept of democracy (Schwedler 2006:179). Islah itself has elected the 
same leaders for more than 15 years (Schwedler 2006:195).  
 
The Islah has the highest rates in membership growth of all Yemeni parties and is a 
very popular party (Phillips 2008:146). The Islah  is internally  heterogeneous and a 
pool for several even contradiction groups like Salafi groups, tribal leaders, religious 
businessmen, religious moderates and Zaydi leaders which is its dilemma to navigate 
between this “ideological inconsistencies” (Knysh 2001:404; Phillips 2008:139). 
Phillips argues that the Islah is the party that is most likely to benefit from eventual 
shifts of power (Phillips 2008:137).  Recently, the Islah joint the Joint Meeting Parties 
where all opposition parties consult. After marginalisation through the GPC, the Islah 
shifts slowly towards an oppositional role (Browers 2007:569). 
 
The electoral system 
The electoral system is First Past the Post system, where every candidate is elected 
if he/she won the relative majority of votes. It is criticised because it lacks the right 
representation of votes.  Some parties – especially the GPC – can obtain more seats, 
than they attracted in percent (Majed 2005:22). This enforces a strong actor like the 
GPC once it arrived in a power position. Research by the National Democratic 
Institute shows, that while the GPC received around 58 % of popular vote, it got 76% 
of all  seats while Islah and the YSP got less seats than they would get by popular 
vote (Phillips 2008:146). However, this system is less expensive, simple and is 
therefore easily accessible for illiterate citizen (Majed 2005:18). A First Past the Post 
System is perhaps less critical in countries that are more homogenous than Yemen 
like e.g. the United Kingdom, because it enables a high personalisation of candidates 
and sidelines party affiliations. On the other hand, it normally allows regional and 
independent candidates to gain offices while a representative system would be to the 
benefit of parties.  
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As Schwedler argues, the regime utilises elections and manipulates it outcome to 
produce pro regime majorities while leaving some manageable space for opposition 
groups (Schwedler 2006:145). 87.000 security forces helped for example to secure 
the 2003 elections and assisted in vote counting, sometimes apart from observers 
(Phillips 2008:60).  
 
The criticism of centralisation was faced with a reform in 2001 and shows an 
example for modification by the regime. As a sign of decentralisation, local councils 
were set up in 2001, but the outcome is rather a way of expanding control of the 
central state (Day 2006:127). However, this leads to the practice of “withdrawing 
confidence” for local officials that are appointed by the government through those 
councils (Day 2006:129).  
 
Other problems are a missing central register and the missing will to reform 
administrative capacities (al-Mikhlafi 2005:108). It is not just the structural 
predominance of the GPC, which has become path dependent and self-enforcing. 
Administrative capacities and a huge bureaucracy hinder effective democratisation. 
Alternation in office and the right to struggle for support is only possible if desired by 
the regime.  
 
Military and security services 
The military has become a main source of power. Phillips argues that the military 
and security services are the “baseline guarantee” against serious challenges for the 
government (Phillips 2008:68; Sivan 2000:75). Furthermore, there exists the Political 
Security Organisation which is the domestic intelligence service and main 
intelligence-gathering agency (Phillips 2008:68). Yemen gives officially 6.6 % of its 
GDP for military purposes, thereby holding rank seven worldwide (CIA 2009).   
If security institutions are including, this amount grows to 25% of central 
government’s spending (following officially figures; Phillips 2008:70)  
 
Carapico points out, that the military “already governs” and army, republican guard, 
internal security and coast guard forces are operating and controlling parts of the 
country (Carapico 2007:157). The second most powerful person in Yemen is , 
according to Phillips, Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, who is the commander of the North-
western Military District and of the First Armoured Division and has a wide support in 
the military (Phillips 2008:52). Military operations violated human rights regulations 
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through executions and other incidents while extra juridical killings that could be 
retraced towards the government are not the norm (Carapico 2007:158). As Dreze 
showed, militarism in armed conflicts is opposed to democracy (Dreze:2000:1178). 
Also trafficking within the military has increased as the military budget became 
intransparent and weapons are used for local and regional markets including Somalia 
(International Crisis Group 2009:16). Carapico argues that the military is following its 
own goals (Carapico 2007:155).  
  
Tribes 
Some researchers like Majed see a major problem in the “historical legacy of the 
tribe-based culture” (Majed 2005:20). Tribalism or qabaliyah has a long tradition in 
Yemen and managed to be established as an influential social category (Bruck 
2005a:8; Mashhur 2005:26). This is due to tribal capability to change things and their 
reliance on rural structures (Swagman 1988:253f.). Schwedler criticises that the 
existence of tribes had let to the perception of the country as “traditional” although 
only 25 percent of Yemenis are tribal (Schwedler 2006:136f.). However, these tribes 
have managed to be an influential part of Yemeni society.  
As several researchers showed, there is a widespread tribalism in Northern and 
Eastern parts of the country (Majed 2005:13). Tribes are dominant in peripheral 
governorates like Marib, al-Jawf, Shabwa or Saada in which the state is widely 
absent and does not provide security, infrastructure or public services (International 
Crisis Group 2009:7; Schwedler 2006:205). There, tribes ensure protection for family 
members and provide structures like their own jurisprudence.  
Tribes in the South are muss smaller and less cohesive than the Northern ones and 
are not that associated due to the British breaking down and the Marxist government 
(Phillips 2008:92). Since the unification, tribal culture became increasingly dominant 
in Southern Yemen, partly encouraged by authorities (al-Mikhlafi 2005:91). Phillips 
underlines that the question of tribes is related to legitimate sources of political 
authority and tribes are in some parts of Yemen the main authorities and have 
functions which are normally associated with a state (Phillips 2008:90).  
 
Tribes are not affiliated with one special party, but loyalty is mostly based on 
personal relations (al-Kamim 2005:73). Some researchers argue that tribes are 
damaging democratic principles and values because they would refer to the use of 
violence instead of a peaceful conflict resolution that would be inherent in democracy 
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(al-Kamim 2005:73). It occurs commonly that violent incidents among tribes occur 
because they see themselves above state law and neglect every state influence in 
their affairs (Phillips 2008:99). Tribes tend to use their own juridical structures. Other 
researchers argue that tribes not principally cause violent conflicts and that a 
modernisation of every aspect of life could resolve problems (al-Kamim 2005:73).  
The connections and use of various actors for their purposes are damaging. There 
exist different perceptions between not only the state and tribe, but also between 
other tribes, that do not accept a common authority. Because of their affiliation to a 
certain area, tribes can be perceived as something like landlords that regulate local 
disputes and form some kind of identity. However, tribes are opposed to state rule of 
law as they rely on their own systems. Only 30 % of the Yemeni population rely on 
formal judiciary while the rest relies on sheiks that are settling disputes while larger 
sheiks are allowed to operate their own prisons (Phillips 2008:102). A study by the 
World bank reports that over 60% of the firms see tribal influences as decisive for 
policy formulation while 50% see private players  as influential (The World Bank 
2002:62). 
 
The president already emphasised tribes before unification from time to time and built 
an image of  the qabili warrior, that is also named as a motive for abducting tourists 
and oil company personal (Bruck 2005a:9). After unification, president Salih enforced 
retribalisation to weaken the YSP (Schwedler 2006:137).  The state even pays 
sheiks, cuts salary if there is disagreement and uses the Ministry for tribal affairs to 
co-opt them (Phillips 2008:104). 
 
Especially in peripheral governorates, kidnapping of foreigners and citizens remained 
normal to press the government to release family members or build roads 
(International Crisis Group 2009:7).  
 
Tribes are a structure of control and power and are accepted in some parts of 
Yemen, especially in Northern provinces. They are legimatised actors, that are 
regarded as trustworthy, perhaps more trustworthy than the state. They are therefore 
a main actor for democratisation and stabilisation. As a main actor in some areas of 
Yemen, they need to be involved, if basic structures are to be changed. In addition, 
tribes may be modified, but it is more the prominence of leaders and the focus on 
individual affiliations that cause problems because they open the space for 
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patronage. Those actors may be regarded as legitimate, but they are no 
representatives of a democratic system.  
 
4.1.2 Infrastructure and civil society 
This chapter mainly focuses on Dahls factors for freedom to establish organisations 
and to become member of those (1), freedom of speech (2) and alternative 
information sources (6). Infrastructural factors are added to enable an image of a 
possible output-legitimation. 
 
Public 
The society is one of the most important pillars for every bottom-up approach 
towards democratisation. However, every researcher needs to be aware of applying 
western style models of civil society (Phillips 2008:113). 
 
Phillips indicates the number of registered NGOs in Yemen to 4.930 in 2005 (Phillips 
2008:17 a. 127). She argues that president Salih had weakened society so that it is 
subordinated to him and that it is too fragmented to be strong (Phillips 2008:6). 
NGOs are often corrupt, incompetent, without experience, resource seeking and 
government influenced and it is argued, that they serve power structures 
(International Crisis Group 2009:27; Phillips 2008:114). The government has even 
founded own democratic organisations or charitable organisations like the al-Salih 
organisation that tries to occupy charitable activities that are normally reserved to 
Islamic organisations (Phillips 2008:116). Néfissa underlines the different role of 
service and advocacy orientated NGOs in comparison to political NGOs (Néfissa 
2005:3).  
 
Phillips argues, that without connections to the regime, every organisation (also 
media or advocacy groups) has difficulties to be heard and to stay solvent (Phillips 
2008:113). Often, pressure groups are highly personalised and are therefore easier 
to integrate into patronage networks (Néfissa 2005:12). Some civil society actors are 
repressed and are tortured in prison (Chase 2003:230). The government undermines 
the base of organisations by confusing and marganilsing through cloning 
organisations that become too strong and too influential (Phillips 2008:117). On the 
other hand, Chase argues that civil society is relatively powerful and is able to put 
some pressure on the state (Chase 2003:228). Nevertheless, not only organisations 
are often fragmented and without influence. The Yemeni society is socially more 
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fragmented than other states in the region (Bruck 2005a:8). Different sections of 
society enjoy various rights and duties dependent on local perceptions of power and 
values (Majed 2005:20). A common identity is difficult to achieve. Bruck argues that 
an encouragement for a common identity that contradicts some aspects of other 
identities is likely to clash (Bruck 2005a:253). A pluralistic Yemen would be a 
possible solution. 
 
Furthermore, there is some evidence, that although political demonstrations 
frequently occur, security forces are present and become sometimes more active. 
HRW refers to violence and brutality against demonstrations in South Yemen 
(Human Rights Watch 2009; Freedom House 2009).  
 
Overall, citizens are free to found new groups and are allowed to become member of 
those. This criterion is fulfilled. However, the emergence of real pressure groups is 
actually rare and if they become to powerful, the regime starts with cooptation or 
confusion. The civil society organisations are not capable to become strong 
advocates of democratisation. It is more likely, that political protests against the 
regime gain in force and can become a trigger for democratisation.  
 
Human development 
Yemen has a low GDP, weak human assets a high economic vulnerability and a 
expected declining life expectancy (Carapico 2007:159; UNDP 2009b). Around 50 % 
of the population is living of less than 2 dollar per day, while over 40 % are living 
under the overall national poverty line (UNDP 2009b). State services are normally 
lacking or reduced and are partly filled by charitable organisations of the Islah party 
that provide basic services and are very popular (Phillips 2008:144). That model of 
waqf – of charitable religious organisations that provide support for people’s needs - 
is often present in other countries in the Arab world (Sivan 2000:73). Waqf substitute 
lacking state services. 
 
The population growth lies with around 3 % at the higher end of scale, while the 
fertility rate is very high with around 5.3 % (UNDP 2009b). The child mortality rate 
under 5 years is high and under nourishment is growing in numbers while around 60 
% of all Yemenis have faced food insecurity between 2002 and 2004 (UNDP 
2009a:12a.123; UNDP 2009b). The Human Development recently rose from a HDI of 
0.49 in 1995 to 0.58 in 2007 (UNDP 2009B).  The gini-coefficient is similar to those of 
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several European countries, but inequality is rising (UNDP 2009b, UNDP 
2009a:116). Elite circles are relatively small, oil revenues not that high than in other 
countries and a vast majority of population lives on the same poverty level. Theory 
suggests that war is more likely to re-erupt where living conditions are poor like in the 
Yemeni case (Hegre 2004:247). 
 
The Yemeni government has subscribed to the Human Rights Convention and this 
has become part of official discourse (Hamidi 2009:177).  Those Human Rights 
agreements are enforced through the government as part of it’s development 
strategy, because of more international development aid and because of normative 
framing from Yemeni civil society (Chase 2003:234). However, extra juridical 
detention occurs in Yemen and there exist around 1.000 political prisoners as UNDP 
reports (UNDP 2009a:61f.). Other treatments are child marriages (around 37 percent 
of young women are married with 18) and assaults against women (around 50 
percent of married women; UNDP 2009a:82f. a.87). While women rights are within 
legislation quite remarkable and women movements are active in Yemen, the country 
is in reality dominated by tribes and it’s – for women negative – value system (Majed 
2005:13). Sharia or Islamic law do not contradict women participation in this case, 
but rather a “tribe-based social-cultural legacy” that has negative effects (Majed 
2005:15).  The rural area is dominated by “tribal structures, extended kinship units, 
and patronage networks” which is actually improving towards state influence, but 
means still, that the Salih regime does not exercise authority (Schwedler 2006:136).  
 
The educational situation is shaped by insecurity and Yemen has a high illiteracy rate 
(Majed 2005:22). The literacy rate is around 60 % and over one third of population is 
not capable to read and write (UNDP 2009b). Women are less educated and only 
have a literacy rate of around 40 % (UNDP 2009b). The education itself is often of 
poor quality (Phillips 2008:11). 
 
The civil war of 1994 has lead to the destruction of infrastructure and institutions of 
the former Southern state (Carapico 2007:166). This still influences today’s 
capacities. As argued by theory, the state focuses on the biggest cities and ignores 
rural areas, especially in region, where opposition groups are growing. The 
urbanisation rate is very low at 32 % compared to 57 % in the Middle East, but is 
strongly growing (The World Bank 2009; UNDP 2009a). The overall performance 
concerning human development remains relative weak. 
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Electricity and Water 
The electric grid is not regularly working in Yemen. Most of the power grid has been 
destroyed in the civil war (Carapico 2007:169). Some regions are still not connected 
and those communities resent government interference in local affairs (like in Saada; 
Carapico 2007:170). Overall, lack of electricity is widespread in Yemen. The average 
number of power disruption for firms lies at 75 days per year, and at 82 days of 
inadequate water supply (The World Bank 2002:60). Yemen has few internal water 
resources facing high population numbers, population growth and greater water 
shortages due to the climate change (UNDP 2009a:11, 38 a. 48). Water scarcity 
forces mostly women and children to walk or climb long routes to get access to water 
and girls are dropping out of the school system (IRIN 2009a).  Water conflicts 
became a main issue causing even violence because of extensive agricultural use 
(e.g. for qat and cash crops) and due to a bad water management (Carapico 
2007:160; 171). Other reports suggest that there had been improvements in some 
regions (Caton 2005:340). Overall, neither the electricity, nor the water situation is 
satisfying and those scarcities are causing diverse other problems. 
 
Media 
Yemen has a relative free press compared to other Middle Eastern countries 
(Schwedler 2006:93). It is characterised as “partly free” by Freedom House (Freedom 
House 2009). Sarah Phillips argues there exists a relatively open political space for 
alternative voices, which is different from strict authoritarianism (Phillips 2008:3). She 
points out, that citizens have the right to speak relatively freely while they do not have 
the capability to act so (Phillips 2008:6). The relatively lively debate on 
democratisation is a positive achievement and Yemeni expect outcomes of the 
electoral process (Phillips 2008:56). There is a limited access to independent 
sources of information (Phillips 2008:11). Withstanding, the Crisis Group assigns that 
there exists an information vacuum because of fear of state repression concerning in-
depth analysis and criticism of the conflict in Saada (International Crisis Group 
2009:26). There exist parts of the country were access to media is limited (Hamadi 
2009:169). The government controls and uses national television, websites and 
posters for showing their point of view and rarely mention the other side (Day 
2006:126). 
However, during periods of fighting, reports that contrasted with official 
interpretations emerged and lead to “rumour” in society (Hamadi 2009:175). Many of 
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the weekly newspapers are associated with political parties and have different 
perspectives (Schwedler 2006:93). The new generation frequently uses the internet 
to bypass governmental control and spreads alternative information to those who do 
not have access (Hamadi 2009:178).  
 
Overall, the access to alternative information sources is relatively open, but can be 
disrupted from time to time.  
  
4.1.3 Economy 
Phillips characterises the system as a patronage system that is based on oil 
revenues and its ability to redistribute resources (Phillips 2008:5). In neopatrimonial 
system, leaders divide those that may become an opposition, manipulate and 
channel existing divisions and present themselves as arbitrators between conflicting 
parties (Phillips 2008:5). Day emphasises that the “political distribution of resources 
is flexible” (Day 2006:132). The Ministry of Finance is a central institution for 
distribution of resources (Phillips 2008:73). As Bruck argues, accumulation and 
distribution of wealth is one of the criteria of the new elite that is made up of army 
and police officers, sheikhs, merchants and technocrats (Bruck 2005b:257ff.). 
Authors as Ross proofed that oil (and nonfuel minerals) hinder democracy especially 
in poor states because of a rentier state (Ross 2001:356). 
 
As a survey by the World Bank in 2001 has shown, poor governance manifests in 
corruption and inefficiency, ineffective or absent market-promoting institutions and 
poor performance in delivering public services (The World Bank 2002:57). This study 
showed that businesses see the greatest concerns in institutional/administrative 
problems (corruption, taxes, smuggling), uncertainty and to a lesser extent in 
infrastructure and input issues (The World Bank 2002:59). 85% of companies report 
irregular payments (The World Bank 2002:59). Yemen is an applicant country for 
EITI and is expected to enforce its transparency (EIT 2009I). The economic system is 
actually indifferent up to negative towards democratisation as oil revenues are still 
dominant. 
 
4.1.4 Is democratisation probable?   
In Yemen exist multiparty elections (not fair and free) and public discourse that might 
be a sign towards democratisation, on the other hands it is an “imperfect dictatorship” 
as Carapico argues (Carapico 2007:157). The government did not manage to 
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improve the situation, it developed to the contrary: According to a World Bank report 
of 2005, indicators declined between 1998 and 2004 in categories of voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and control of corruption (Phillips 2008:63).  
 
Dahl’s factors are partly fulfilled and partly not fulfilled. Interestingly, the government 
and other actors, refer to people’s desire (8). This lets to the argumentation, that the 
Salih government is perhaps less authoritarian than expected or that is faces some 
kind of “Yemeni democracy”. This is contested by other factors. Alternation in office 
(4) and the right to struggle for voter’s support (5) are rather limited.  Especially 
alternation in office is improbable if not enforced by the regime. The right to vote 
exists (3), although the elections are not free and fair (7). Political leaders are not 
free in their struggle for support and voters supply. The wide reach of patronage 
networks hinders efforts towards democratisation that even reach towards 
infrastructure and civil society. Coalitions are mostly instrumental towards power and 
not principally directed towards the people’s interest. Those are sometimes fulfilled 
by coincidence.  
 
Overall, the civil society rights and freedoms are relatively good provided. Facing the 
strong obstacles of ruling structures, the civil society is well established and is 
relatively free, but not without governmental influence. The freedom of association is 
guaranteed (1), as well as the freedom of speech, although arbitrary arrests occur 
(2). Some parts of the country lack access to alternative information sources (6), 
which is partly due to government control and partly to missing resources. However, 
the overall infrastructure is very weak especially in rural areas that are far from 
centre. This is influencing the resource base and the capacity to form an overall 
Yemeni public. Although the main freedoms are guaranteed and public movements 
can become a point of departure for democratisation, the outcome is low due to 
missing resources and lacking transparency.  
 
The overall democratic performance is not probable towards democratisation for 
ruling structures and is between slightly probable and indifferent regarding civil 
society factors. Regarding economic factors is democratisation slightly improbable 
until indifferent. The situation towards democratisation is improbable, because of the 
impact of ruling structures.  
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The plurality of actors needs to be handled to overcome animosities between groups. 
Minority rights can become a solution for sectarian actors. Federalism and inclusion 
of sheiks as regional representatives ignore democratic representation, but could 
enable them to become agents for transformation. In regions where tribes do not play 
a dominant role, elected regional representatives could ensure democracy. For 
tribally dominated areas, a democratisation will be time dependent. Tribes are using 
some state functions like the control over territory, but are not providing services of 
the state. Some sheiks use their power position to enhance their own position. 
However, if tribes and their families have more incentives, those will be more open 
for state functions in their areas.   
 
The tribes oppose the central authority. While the central  authority is necessary for a 
successful democratisation process, tribes are indirectly hindering democratisation. 
On the other hand, they are a traditional form of government that needs to be 
included in democratisation processes. A democratisation of tribes may lead to more 
democratisation from the bottom. The problem emerges how a fragmented tribe can 
be democratised and how the diversity of tribal structures in Yemen can be faced.   
 
Yemen has one of the best legal preconditions for democratisation. The reality lacks 
behind, mainly due to patronage networks and weakness of institutions. The opacity 
of the system makes clear power structures difficult to identify. Transparency is 
necessary to make it easier for civil society groups to criticise the government. EITI 
could be an approach. However, patronage networks need to be modified over a long 
period and perceptions need to be changed.  
 
A regime change could enable new democratisation. However, for real changes, a 
reasonable people movement is necessary and bottom-up democratisation needs 
more offensive approaches. 
 
4.2. Stabilisation and Development 
This chapter analysis stabilisation and identifies main security obstacles. It starts with 
an analysis of development and stability in Yemen, before I argue that Yemen is a 
failing state. This chapter ends with implications of security problems. 
 
4.2.1 Development and stability 
Indicators of a failing state are used, beginning with the armed conflict in the Saada 
governorate.  External involvements, economic factors and societal cleavages are 
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identified. Infrastructural problems have already be named and should be in mind, as 
well as tribal alignments, that are not only important for democratisation, but also for 
stabilisation 
 
Al-Huthi rebellion 
Since 2003, immense fighting between a Huthi-rebellion and governmental forces 
occurred in the governorate of Saada (ill.3 and 7). This started after failed mediation 
between the regional leader al-Huthi and the government (Hamidi 2009:170). 
 
The International Crisis group speaks of an ongoing war since 2004 (International 
Crisis Group 2009: I). The conflict is classified as being asymmetric because it is a 
war between a minority and government (Miall/Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 2005:12). 
The reasons for war are the “decline of the social stratum, led by Hashemite and 
legitimised by Zaydism […], failed management of religious pluralism, lack of 
investment in Zaydi strongholds like Saada after 1962, permeability to external 
influences and the emergence of new political and religious actors, in particular 
Salafis” (International Crisis Group 2009:5).  Zaydi Hashemite are normally declaring 
the republic to be illegitimate, but accept the status quo (Hamidi 2009:166). However, 
a Zaydi concept is the principle of rising against unjust ruler (Browers 2007:573f.). 
After the civil war of 1994, Saada had been a region of regime opposition that has 
been ignored and marginalised by central government (International Crisis Group 
2009: I). Until the end of Imamate, Hashemite had been dominant in Yemeni politics 
but today, Huthi try to defend Zaydi identity from diminishing (International Crisis 
Group 2009:1). The rebellion becomes a vehicle for protest.   
 
The original leader, al-Huthi, was killed in 2004 by security forces, but the conflict 
continued (International Crisis Group 2009:2). From 2005 on, war continued on a low 
scale and transformed until 2006 into a clash between pro-government tribesmen 
and pro-rebel tribesmen (International Crisis Group 2009:3). The naming of a new 
governor to Saada led to a temporary suspension of fighting. In 2007 occurred a 
fourth round of fighting that ended with Qatari mediation and through the pledge of 
financial support for reconstruction of the Saada governorate when both sides signed 
a ceasefire (International Crisis Group 2009:4).  
The government still accused Huthi of continued fighting and launched heavy military 
attacks (International Crisis Group 2009:4). Due to international critique on the 
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humanitarian situation in Saada, the government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 
the 17.6.2008 (International Crisis Group 2009:4).  
 
Since March 2009, tensions have grown again. It resulted in air bombings and large-
scale military operations by government on the Saada region apart from 12th of 
August 2009 (International Crisis Group 2009:4; IRIN 2009c). A large scale of force, 
including extrajuridical killings, use of heavy weaponry and killings including children, 
marks the conflict itself (Hamidi 2009:171). The fighting spread and includes local 
tribes and other parts of the Saada population, which contributes to its endurance 
(International Crisis Group 2009: I). Often schools, homes or mosques became a 
target of attacks and most of the infrastructure became destroyed (International 
Crisis Group  2009:4). The destruction of villages and infrastructure through the army 
has lead to further resistance in Northern governorates (International Crisis Group 
2009:13). The overall number of IDPs rose to 175.000 since the beginning of fighting 
in 2003 (IRIN 2009c). Yemen has furthermore nearly 100.000 refugees from Somalia 
(CIA 2009). 
  
Both sides accuse each other of being dependent on international actors (USA and 
Saudi Arabia on the government’s side and Hezbollah and Iran on the other; 
International Crisis Group 2009: I a. 12). Critics of the Huthi accused them of 
sectarianism and undermining national unity and the government even labelled them 
as terrorists. There is no clear evidence for terrorism or an Iranian involvement 
(International Crisis Group 2009:12).  However, international support is common and 
part of the geopolitical and sectarian rivalry as Qatar carried out  mediations that 
were supported by Saudi Arabia, and Libya is financing the rebels (International 
Crisis Group 2009:17).  Saudi Arabia has different – sometimes diverting - interests 
in Yemen like funding of tribal, religious or military segments but also in undermining 
government control while hindering a spill over to the own country (International 
Crisis Group 2009:18). Actually, Saudi-Arabian forces jointed the fight against the al-
Huthi and launched air raids (IRIN 2009b; BBC 2009b).  
The international crisis group assigns that the international community had not 
recognised the destabilising potential of the conflict (International Crisis Group 2009: 
II a.1). 
 
A majority actually defends themselves against the state. The Crisis Group identifies 
four insurgent groups: A minority with a clear ideology and with political ties to Iran, a 
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small group that seeks to defend Zaydi and Hashemite identity against Sunnism or 
even Wahabism, a group of armed men with financial motivation, and a tribal majority 
that defends their families and villages against state violence (International Crisis 
Group 2009:5).  
 
The war has included tribal vendettas (thar) that enforced conflict and lowered 
ideological or religious motivations (International Crisis Group 2009: 14). Tribes are 
seeking for power or are receiving government help, but are also protecting their 
families against state violence (Phillips 2008:108). The Crisis Group argues, that the 
conflict has become self-perpetuating, based on a war economy where tribes, army 
officers and state officials used the opportunity to gain control over border regions to 
Saudi Arabia or over the Red Sea coastline (International Crisis Group 2009:II). 
Illegal sales of qat or weapons are a source of money and control over border lines 
are important trading lines (International Crisis Group 2009:15f.). Research by Hegre 
shows that conflicts including rebel groups, that are funded by drugs, or civil wars 
with economic interests tend to be long (Hegre 2004:24). Although it is actually a 
regional conflict, there are supraregional actors involved. 
 
The Crisis Group points out, that the conflict is related to internal power structures in 
the government, where some actors desire the succession of Salih while others want 
to stabilise their position (International Crisis Group 2009:5).   One of the profiteers is 
Major-General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, who’s troops are involved in disproportionate 
use of force (International Crisis Group 2009: 15).  
 
Reconstruction became a major issue for Saada citizens and it was claimed as a 
precondition for ending fighting. Furthermore, the Crisis Group underlines that Huthi 
would prefer increased tolerance by the state for a conflict solution (International 
Crisis group 2009:26). Another way is to defeat the rebel group e.g. by cutting 
finances or by increasing trading costs for the rebels (Hegre 2004:245) which is more 
difficult in failing states. 
 
Simultaneously secessionist sentiments are rising in former South Yemen, where 
demonstrations are becoming more massive (Hamadi 2009:180; International Crisis 
Group 2009:1).  Some researchers see Yemen on the way towards a new civil war 
between the North and the South (Phillips 2008:47). There are arguments that 
43 
Southern regions could use the instability in Saada to start their own secession or at 
least to enforce their position through threat of war.  
 
The solution of conflict is one main source of authority for the government. If it is not 
able to restore its authority, other actors are motivated to use the weakness of state. 
The benefits for being part of the Yemeni state are for some Huthi Zaydi simply not 
visible and fears of identity loss spread. Tribalisation and recent air raids by Saudi 
Arabia mean that it becomes more than a regional war. The war creates its own 
benefits and becomes self-enforcing. The failure of Qatari mediation is due to 
absence of follow-up and monitoring mechanisms and partially to ongoing 
competition between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (International Crisis Group 2009:22).    
 
External involvements in Yemeni politics 
The United States of America recently provided Yemen with huge amounts of military 
aid and equipment to fight terrorism, this, however, is now used to combat the Saada 
rebellion (Phillips 2008:33). The USA suspected the Yemeni state for being a refuge 
for terrorists of the al-Qaeda network that was responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The 
Yemeni government portrayed itself as antagonist of terrorism and gained support of 
the USA. Furthermore, international donors had granted over $ 7 billion between 
2002 and 2006, although Yemen’s capacity to absorb this is very low (Phillips 
2008:75).  
 
As the International Crisis point argues, the conflict in the Saada governorate is 
“shaped by the regional confrontation of Iran and Saudi Arabia (International Crisis 
Group 2009: I). Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia supported the spread of Salafism and 
Wahabism in Yemen and Saudi Arabia is regularly financing the government for its 
military campaigns (around 10 million USD per month in periods of fighting, see: 
Hamidi 2009:172; Phillips 2008:39).). The Saudi state wants to prevent a 
destabilisation of its border to Yemen and a spread of violence to its own territory. On 
the other hand, Saudi Arabia wants to hinder a Yemen that could challenge the Saudi 
state as a regional leader. The diverse involvements of especially Saudi Arabia are 
an unsure factor in Yemeni history and have stabilising and destabilising effects. 
There are voices that see the need for additional international actions. The 
International Crisis Group sees a revision of the international position on the Saada 
conflict with more pressure on the government and reconstruction efforts as crucial 
for its solution (International Crisis Group 2009:27).   
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Economy and GDP 
Yemen had a relatively good GDP growth in the 1990 in comparison with the overall 
performance of the region (ill.8). It is classified as a low-income country and has an 
unemployment rate of around 30%, for young people of around 50 % (UNDP 
2009a:100; 127).  
 
The government of Yemen established a program of economic reform in 1995, which 
partly resulted in an economic growth of 6.4 % during 1995-2000 (The World Bank 
2002:1).  The World Bank stated that a rapid and sustained growth (at around 5 
%/year) is needed for poverty reduction in Yemen (The World Bank 2002:1). The 
government respects claims to achieve an average GDP growth of 9 % until 2025 as 
well as a reduction of oil dependency (The World Bank 2002:1). Given the actual 
situation, it seems improbable that those targets will be achieved.  Recently, GDP 
grew around 4.1 %/year for the time between 1997 and 2007 (The World Bank 
2009). Yemen is one of the most open and trade-liberalised countries in the MENA 
world, but Yemen’s export goods are very volatile in prices (The World Bank 
2002:71). 
 
There are severe problems for development: The World Bank identifies weak 
governance, corruption, high taxes and inefficient tax administration as well as unfair 
business practices, a high risky investment climate, problems in specialisation and 
little value added, uncompetitive infrastructure services, expensive land and legal 
services and insufficient transport as major obstacles (The World Bank 2002:2). 
Larger firms are better able to internalise those risks and profit from networks of 
influence (The World Bank 2002:2).  The bad security situation and weak legal and 
administrative conditions hinder new sectors to develop (The World Bank 2002:3).  
 
Corruption has destructive effects on investment and economic growth (The World 
Bank 2002:58). Transparency international rates Yemen on rank 154 with a score of 
2,1 in the CPI and the situation has worsened since the CPI 2008  (Transparency 
International 2009). The Yemeni investment climate is the least competitive in the 
Arab World (Iraq and Palestine excluded; Phillips 2008:64). This hinders foreign 
direct investments and an overall economic development. 
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Rents and Remittances 
The government depends with around 75 % of its budget on oil revenues and foreign 
aid and the export share of oil increased to around 90% (Phillips 2008:63). 
Remittances are responsible for around 6% of GDP (UNDP 2009b). As all patronage 
systems are dependent on those revenues, Phillips sees Yemen at a “hand-to-mouth 
existence” (Phillips 2008:63). Carapico points towards individual enrichment through 
oil rents but also through aid programs (Carapico 2007:173).  
Yemen is dependent on external payments and workers remittances and gets 
problems if those are reduced (Chase 2003:225). Yemen is dependent on the 
international environment. 
 
Oil rents are expected to decline if no further oil reserves are found (The World Bank 
2002:4). Given the current extraction level, Yemeni oil resources will be consumed by 
2012 (Phillips 2008:40).  
 
Sectarian divides 
Yemen has a wide sphere of militant groups that encompasses Afghan-Arabs, 
Salafis, Wahhabis, the Islamic Army or al-Qeda to name only a few radical ones 
(Carapico 2007:155).  Terrorist actions like the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 
showed the connection to terrorism and hindered development, e.g. foreign 
investments (Carapico 2007). Those incidents raised the awareness of several 
politicians and political scientists.  Recently Yemen became an American ally and 
allowed American units to operate on their territory (Downes 2004:277 a.294). 
 
Yemen has multiple confessions like the Zaydi of Saada, the tribal dominated Shafi’I 
Sunnism in the Southeast and small Isma’ili communities (Knysh 2001:402). Dresch 
refers to the division between Upper and Lower Yemen where Upper Yemen consists 
of the highlands region, while Lower Yemen consists of Ta’izz, Ibb and Hodeidah 
(Dresch 2001:14f.). A narrative of North-South rivalry still exits (Browers 2007:568). 
Phillips refers to a sectarian divide, because Upper Yemen is mainly Zaydi shi’ite and 
Lower Yemen is mostly Shafi’I Sunni, although Zaydism is close to Sunni and 
animosities are rare (Phillips 2008:41; Day 2006:122)13. It is argued by some 
Yemenis that the spread of Salafism and Wahabism threatens Zaydism (International 
Crisis Group 2009:6).  Zaydi Hashemite claim a supreme divine leadership as 
necessary and the Imamate like in Northern Yemen until the 1960s is the main form 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed study on Zaydism: Bruck 2005 
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of rule (Hamadi 2009:166ff.). Contemporary Zaydism sees change through free and 
fair elections as accepted (Hamadi 2009:169).  
 
Another sectarian direction is Sufism that remerges in contemporary Yemen and 
manifests in the great number of shrines of saints within the country (Knysh 
2001:401). Sufism tried to become part of a “new identity” of Yemen and it opposes 
Wahabism or Salafism (Knysh 2001:401 a. 404).    
 
When different contradicting religious sects encounter each, this may occasionally 
lead to violence (Knysh 2001:404). Some radical Salafi members disrupt Sufi 
chanting or even destroy shrines of local saints, which leads to violence and even 
death of opponents (Knysh 2001:405 a. 409). Salafis and Sufis use different 
education institutions to enforce their views among younger Yemenis and both 
groups use modern propaganda techniques to discredit the other (Knysh 2001:406). 
Frequently teachings of sectarian leaders are obeyed and are followed without 
questioning (Knysh 2001:410). This shows autocratic elements in sectarian sections 
of society.  
 
Sectarian conflicts are more threatening for stabilisation than for democratisation. 
 
Resources and discontent 
Natural resources are unequally distributed between resource poor Upper Yemen 
and the much richer Lower Yemen (Phillips 2008:41f.). Areas outside the highlands 
have around 80 percent of Yemen’s oil, fisheries and seaports. Especially oil and 
seaports generate government revenues (Day 2006:133). The other 20 percent of oil 
resources are located in Marib in Upper Yemen, which is rather sceptical towards the 
Salih regime (Phillips 2008:42). The country has huge potentials in tourism and has 
natural resources like Gold, Platinum, Gypsum, Titanium etc. that are widely 
unexploited caused by the security situation (The World Bank 2002:4f.).  It is mostly 
the former Southern Yemen that critics the political and economical divide between 
Upper and Lower Yemen and especially the regions of Aden and Hadramaut are 
discontent with the economic resource allocation which lead to anti regime protests in 
2007 (Phillips 2008:121). 
 
Economic resources are not equally distributed. However, with declining oil revenues 
economic distribution might become equally poor. Other resources may become a 
point for patronage systems, but this will be on a lower level. The economic 
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conditions are a basis for the regime of president Salih. Access to those resources 
can become a power resource for Southern initiatives to power. However, with 
reduced oil rates, the stability of the regime will be threatened and this can lead to 
unexpected developments in all directions. 
 
Regime stability 
As argued by Schwedler and Phillips, Yemen is seen as a “gray-zone” regime 
between democratisation and autocracy (Schwedler 2006:22; Phillips 2008:2). Those 
regimes are more likely to risk a civil war than consolidated autocracies or 
consolidated democracies (Lacina 2004:194). 
The Salih regime is far from exercising full authority over the whole country because 
Saudi-Arabia has significant influence in border regions and powerful and well-armed 
tribes control areas particularly in the Northeast (Schwedler 2006:113). Phillips 
argues, that a patronage system like the Yemeni system is reasonably good at 
managing or channelling crisis, but is not capable for pre-empting it through 
alternative policies (Phillips 2008:4). Schwedler argues, that this system of flexible 
alliances is more likely to break down, but more likely to become redemocratised if it 
survived instability (Schwedler 2006:75). 
 
However, the Saada conflict shows that the normal strategy of cooptation did not 
function and that the government is not capable to settle conflict by hard power. The 
government relies on hard power in form of military or security operations when soft 
power policies are to risky (Phillips 2008:8). Conflict undermines the stability of the 
regime. Another emerging problem is the high number of IDPs that need to be 
reintegrated. The situation concerning IDPs is becoming worse with continued 
fighting and can become a main pressure for the regime. 
 
Phillips argues, that many Yemenis see it as better to operate within this constrained 
system than facing a possible collapse (Phillips 2008:8). Power sharing agreements 
limit political competition within Yemen and had been to the overall benefit of the 
ruling party. 
 
4.2.2 Yemen as a failing state 
Yemen is signified as a failing state and it shows signs of a failed state but not all 
signs identified by Rotberg and Thürer (see above).  
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First, it is strongly dependent on its leader, president Salih. However, president Salih 
is not capable to exercise power uncontested within the country. The government 
has not full access to every part of the country. The Saada conflict shows that the 
government cannot settle a conflict on a power basis.  
 
Yemen shows cases of political violence especially in relation to elections (Day 
2006:127). This seems normal for authoritarian states and occurs in other states like 
for example Algeria (Roberts 2002:108). However, the scale of political violence is 
relatively low, because the Salih system does not exercise repressive power on a 
large scale.  Religious motivated violence in form of destruction of shrines or attacks 
on “not believers” occurs (Knysh 2001:405 a. 409). Religious conflicts between sects 
like Wahabism, Salafism or Zaydism are increasing in numbers. The Huthi-rebellion 
leads to significant violence in the Saada region that can be identified as an intra-
state-war. The situation with a rebel group is comparable to failed states like e.g. the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo14. The conflict itself is degenerated because the 
point of conflict, protest against a decreasing Hashemite Zaydi identity, has become 
dominated by tribal conflicts and war economies. 
 
Yemen shows regional differences between Upper and Lower Yemen that hinder 
national unity. Linguistic, ethnic or cultural hostilities are relatively rare. A 
delegitimation of the state is mainly manifested in lacking output legitimation because 
the state is not able to provide basic services like water or electricity supply. As the 
state becomes more authoritarian, input legitimation becomes useless. 
 
Like in failed states, institutions in Yemen are weak and overwhelmed by corruption. 
State offices are integrated into the patronage system and are used to establish job 
posts for own supporters. Services that are normally provided by state institutions are 
taking a long time if they are not ‘enhanced’ by bribery.  The state is not capable to 
face infrastructural problems, because of weak institutions and weak capacities. The 
high illiteracy rate indicates problems with the education system and albeit HIV is not 
a problem, other diseases are increasing. Nevertheless, the health system is not fully 
collapsed. 
 
                                                 
14
 For an overview on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the government 
fights against the FDLR, the Lord Resistance Army and other rebel groups International Crisis Group 
2009a. 
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The capability to raise taxes is still existent like the World Bank report suggests. As 
the Transparency Index indicates, Yemen is a relatively corrupt land and the World 
Bank report had shown that the majority of Yemeni is familiar with bribery. The 
patronage systems that are not only based on the president, but are maintained by 
other political or societal leaders, leads to relatively narrow lines of alignment for 
decision making. The elite is fragmented towards different actors within society, is it 
the tribe or the president. Rule of law is reduced in some regions, as tribes use their 
own jurisdiction. The GDP actually increases, but as the population growth is high, 
the GDP relatively stagnates. One positive aspect is that Yemen does not face 
overflowing inflation or the escape in foreign devises.  While most of the population is 
living in dire poverty, under nourishment is growing.  
 
In addition, Saudi Arabia has strongly been involved in Yemeni politics. Recently it 
stabilised its border side towards Yemen and joined fighting against the Huthi 
rebellion. Financial flows remain narrow and information are lacking. This is also true 
for a possible Iranian financing. Another major influence is the U.S. financing for anti-
terrorism operations. 
 
Finally Yemen is to be characterized as a failing state and even if researchers 
emphasise positive aspects of some democratisation, that cannot cover overall 
problems that are posed by rebellion, tribal conflicts, poverty, water and electricity 
scarcity or population growth.  The capability to improve those factors through 
governmental policies is slightly reduced and will be more reduced when oil revenues 
are declining. If the development of Yemen continues in that direction, the state can 
collapse within a few years according.  
 
4.2.3 Is stabilisation possible? 
Factors for democratisation and factors for stabilisation are influencing each other 
and are intertwined. Stabilisation can only slowly enhance the situation and enable 
conditions to strengthen state structures.  Powerful positions regulate the distribution 
of power instead of the state itself. In some regions like Saada, al-Tarib among other 
is a democratisation more as doubtful if dominant actors do not get enough 
incentives. This includes not only rebel groups or tribes, but also Salafis that are 
fighting rebels. Even in the case of incentives for profiteers of war, those actors 
would loose their power. Degenerated institutions, food or water scarcities, security 
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concerns or other life limiting conditions hinder concepts of stabilisation like the 
building of a strong state. 
 
The tribes restrict the central state. While the state is not capable to gain authority, 
tribes and other actors are able to put pressure on the state. Sheiks are still powerful 
actors who want to secure their interests. The principal achievement of conflict 
resolution that is regarded as synonym for stabilisation is the restoring of statehood 
in areas, where the government formerly had no control (Lacina 2004:193). This 
includes not only a stabilisation in terms of security but also in terms of food and 
water supply. The possibility of a stabilisation through the country itself is highly 
improbable, because of missing capacities or willing to do so.  Sheiks are often 
regarded as affiliates of the government and not as state opposing individuals. 
 
In the view of transition towards democracy, it is natural that a state might back clash 
towards civil wars if the democratic development is not fully like in the Yemeni case. 
Nevertheless, Yemen has the chance to come “back on the road”.  
 
The war in Yemen needs to be settled effectively. Not only a negotiated settlement, 
which in the Yemeni case should be relatively easy to achieve due to the history of 
negotiations, but monitoring of peace agreements and clear sanctions in case of non-
compliance are decisive (Hegre 2004:245). However, the question of incentives for a 
settlement emerges. As political interest of the rebels are difficult to identify 
(International Crisis Group 2009b), it needs to be assumed, that better power 
positions in the regions could ensure more openness towards a settlement. 
Furthermore the scope of negotiations should be broadened due to the various 
actors and therefore include all forms of tracks (Track 1- regional governmental level, 
track 2 – NGOs and civil society, track 3 – grass root level 
Miall/Ramsboutham/Woodhouse 2005:19f.) 
 
Minority Rights and federalism could direct towards more stability. While the Salih 
regime tried to promote national unity, it overlooked or ignored desire for regional 
solutions basing on tribal structures. Modifications in the political system are 
necessary. Those may be a wider federalism with a modification of the Shura council 
towards a regional second chamber, which encompasses a fixed number of deputies 
from each region.  Another possibility might be the enforcement of the Salih regime, 
giving it tools to be victorious over rebel groups. This would lead to more 
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authoritarianism because the government would use its capacities, to gain more – 
military – control. It is noteworthy that conflict resolution does not solve a conflict but 
transforms it into peaceful processes (Miall/Ramsboutham/Woodhouse 2005:22). 
 
Another problem is the strong position of the military. With large military expenditures 
emerged a military culture, that is based on authoritarianism and which is self-
enforcing. Acts of military leaders that ignored human rights in the case of bombings 
or targeting killings show a loss of authority. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar has maintained to 
become a powerful actor that could profit of military coups. The political system 
consists of opaque networks of power that are often shifted and not easy to retrace. 
Stabilisation necessaries clear power mechanism that will be consistent for a longer 
time. As the Huthi-rebellion showed, the status-quo between tribes and the 
government is not lasting, and may brake down if the government is not able to 
restore security in the country.  
 
The solutions are a strengthening of government with remaining unclear power 
structures that would lack a democratic component or the restructuring of the system 
that encompasses more transparency. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The theory of democracy and democratisation showed interesting results, although it 
has been difficult to identify decisive elements because of the “multiness” of 
approaches (ill.9). The theory on failing states showed remarkable evidence with the 
Yemeni case. Further research could elaborate mediation strategies for conflict 
settlement and for overall stabilisation of the country.  
 
In literature, the influence of conflict on ongoing democratisation processes in Yemen 
is widely ignored. A new peace settlement with International mediation at best by 
regional actors (Berkovitch/Gartner 2006:331; Frazier/Dixon 2006:394) and 
monitoring of settlement as well as reconstruction in Saada are important steps 
towards stability. The conflict enforces militarism and restriction of human rights and 
necessaries a soon solution. The Yemeni system of power is not as clear as it looks 
and positions Yemen nearer the failed state. There are several tribal systems that 
exist beside the state. Lacking national power structures are a principle obstacle 
towards stabilisation and democratisation. 
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The Salih regime is not uncontested but with a strong claim for unification. Unification 
becomes an illusion, as parts of the country are still inaccessible for the state and the 
rhetoric of unification hides authoritarianism. The system in Yemen is apart of the 
situation of the president very fluent and might shift. Actually, real democratisation 
under president Salih is improbable because of his authoritarian rule for years. The 
individual factor plays an important role. A new opportunity for democratisation can 
be the actual weakness of the regime, but this has destabilising effects. Actual 
problems are the ongoing conflict in Saada with increasing numbers of IDPs, tribal 
rule (but with regional discrepancies), lacking infrastructure, miscellaneous influences 
and networks, the reliance on oil, clienteles, corruption, militarism, a cognitive factor 
(president Salih) and finally diversified enemy perception not only on a local or 
national, but also regional level with regard to Saudi Arabia.   
 
There will be a point, where the regime is no longer capable to hold its promises.  
This might be the case when oil rents decline or when the GPC no longer has access 
to state resources. For the moment, democratisation remains improbable because 
clientele networks of the regime still function.  Even a democratic Yemen would have 
problems facing the situation of water scarcity, regional discrepancies and missing 
infrastructure and necessaries international support. Nevertheless, it could enable 
more accountability and reduce the blown bureaucracy that serves the interest of 
patronage. Not only is the dissatisfaction with the regime, but rather the vague 
network of patronage that shifts coalitions between tribes and manipulates power-
seeking actors, a major obstacle. The importance of ruling structures for 
democratisation is estimated to be around 60% while economic factors –patronage 
networks and rents – and capacity problems within civil society account for around 20 
% each. When facing stabilisation this shifts towards economy although ruling 
structures remain most important.  
 
A change in electoral law and a change in state structures with more effective checks 
and balances seem necessary for achieving more democratisation. Actors must be 
provided with carrots: More official influence (a later democratisation might occur) for 
tribes in form of regional representatives in a new senate could be a possibility.  
 
Yemen’s democratic development is of younger origin and democratisation itself is a 
long-term transition. Yemen needs more time and needs bottom-up democratisation, 
which could effectively use existing possibilities. 
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Illustration 1 – Pirate attacks before Yemen 
 
Source: Reliefweb 2009b 
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Illustration 2: Indexes for Yemen 
Index    
HDI 0,575 140. rank worldwide   
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
(BTI) 2010, best value  
10 
Status Index: 3,91 =r 
educed or blocked 
tranformation , rank  
103 worldwide 
Management Index: 
4,3 = poor , rank 96 
worldwide 
 
Freedom House Rating 
2005 1= free, 7 = 
repressed 
Political rights: 
5 
Civil liberties:5 Partly free 
Index of economic 
freedom 100=best 
value, 0 = worst 
 Rank 103 worldwide Freedom score: 56,9 Indifferent between 
mostly free and 
mostly und´free 
Freedom of the press, 
freedom house 2009, 
0-100, 0 best value 
 79 = not free 
Corruption Perception 
Index 2009, 10 best, 0 
worst 
Rank 154 worldwide 2,1  
Sources: Bertelsmann 2009; UNDP 2009b; The Heritage Foundation 2009; Freedom 
House 2009; TI 2009 
 
 
Illustration 3: Timeline of the War in Saada since 2003 
 
 
Source: Own Illustration according International Crisis Group 2009b:3ff., IRIN 2009c; 
BBC 2009b 
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Illustration 4: Steps towards democratisation 
Core demand Dominant rights Fear of… Desire for… Consequences for 
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I “Peace” Rights for survivor and 
security 
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Material improvements, 
equality of chances 
Social state/ modern 
welfare state 
V „Ecology“/ecological 
peace, global peace 
Ecological and global 
rights of life (ecomic 
rights, rights of nature, 
worldwide rights) 
Destruction of life and 
nature, atomic 
catastrophies, 
ecological disasters, 
danger for natural 
ressources 
Peaceful normality, 
ecological equity, 
universal human rights, 
worldwide proliferation 
New world order, 
systems of collective 
security, protection of 
species, environment and 
life as consitutional 
rights, ethic 
commissions, ecological 
rights, ecological 
councils. 
Source: Guggenberger 2005:136 
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Illustration 5: Study Design 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
Ill ustration 6: Constitutional structures in Yemen 
 
 
Source: Schwedler 2006:104;Phillips 2008:60; Brown 2001; Constitution of Yemen 
2001 
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Illustration 7: The conflict in Saada 
 
Source: Reliefweb 2009a 
 
 
Illustration 8: GDP growth in the 1990s 
 
Source: The World Bank 2002:12.  
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Illustration 9: Democracy and stabilisation 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
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